A Black Hole Attack Model for Reactive Ad-Hoc Protocols by Badenhop, Christopher W.
Air Force Institute of Technology
AFIT Scholar
Theses and Dissertations Student Graduate Works
3-22-2012
A Black Hole Attack Model for Reactive Ad-Hoc
Protocols
Christopher W. Badenhop
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more information, please contact richard.mansfield@afit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Badenhop, Christopher W., "A Black Hole Attack Model for Reactive Ad-Hoc Protocols" (2012). Theses and Dissertations. 1077.
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/1077
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A BLACK HOLE ATTACK MODEL FOR REACTIVE AD-HOC PROTOCOLS 
 
THESIS 
 
 
Christopher W. Badenhop 
 
AFIT/GCO/ENG/12-01 
 
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 
AIR UNIVERSITY 
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 
 
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The views expressed in this Thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or 
the United States Government.  This material is declared a work of the U.S. 
Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. 
AFIT/GCO/ENG/12-01 
 
A BLACK HOLE ATTACK MODEL FOR REACTIVE AD-HOC 
PROTOCOLS 
 
THESIS 
 
Presented to the Faculty 
Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering 
Graduate School of Engineering and Management 
Air Force Institute of Technology 
Air University 
Air Education and Training Command 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
Degree of Master of Science 
 
 
Christopher W. Badenhop 
BS in Computer Science and Engineering 
MS in Computer Engineering 
 
March 2012 
 
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 
AFIT/GCO/ENG/12-01 
 
A BLACK HOLE ATTACK MODEL FOR REACTIVE AD-HOC PROTOCOLS 
 
 
 
 
Christopher W. Badenhop 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved: 
 
 
 
 
___________________________________ ________ 
Dr. Barry E. Mullins, (Chairman) Date 
 
 
___________________________________ ________ 
Major Todd R. Andel, Ph.D USAF (Member)  Date 
 
 
___________________________________ ________ 
Dr. Timothy H. Lacey, (Member)  Date 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
AFIT/GCO/ENG/12-01 
 
Abstract 
Net-Centric Warfare places the network in the center of all operations, 
making it a critical resource to attack and defend during wartime.  This thesis 
examines one particular network attack, the Black Hole attack, to determine if an 
analytical model can be used to predict the impact of this attack on ad-hoc networks.  
An analytical Black Hole attack model is developed for reactive ad-hoc network 
protocols DSR and AODV.  To simplify topology analysis, a hypercube topology is 
used to approximate ad-hoc topologies that have the same average node degree.  An 
experiment is conducted to compare the predicted results of the analytical model 
against simulated Black Hole attacks on a variety of ad-hoc networks.  The results 
show that the model describes the general order of growth in Black Hole attacks as a 
function of the number of Black Holes in a given network.  The model accuracy 
maximizes when both the hypercube approximation matches the average degree and 
number of nodes of the ad-hoc topology.  For this case, the model falls within the 
95% confidence intervals of the estimated network performance loss for 17 out of 20 
measured scenarios for AODV and 7 out of 20 for DSR. 
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I. Introduction 
In the era of Net-Centric Warfare, warfighters utilize Command Control 
Communications Computers Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
systems to conduct distributed execution of missions throughout the theater of 
operation.  These distributed components of the system are linked together by 
military networks to share information and provide dependable and resilient 
coordination, communication, and intelligence services to the warfighters.  Military 
analysts consider this to be a force multiplier; fewer distributed and coordinating 
assets can outperform a larger opponent that executes centrally with little 
coordination [Fol11].  Moreover, the individual components performing distributed 
execution can become specialized to contribute to a particular part of the mission.  
While this has a desirable benefit, it places significant burden on the availability of 
the network.  If the network becomes disrupted due to incorrect configuration, 
failures, or malicious activities the distributed components become isolated.  The 
effect is that specialized units must act on local or outdated global information and 
may need to take on a larger burden of the mission, of which they may not be ideally 
equipped to address.  Unless warfighters have access to secondary communication 
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systems, they have no way to recover from this isolation and may quickly be 
consumed by the enemy.  Thus, because of the use of Net-Centric Operations, the 
network becomes a critical resource to defend and a lucrative target to attack. 
Because of the emerging importance of the network, the Joint Publication for 
Information Warfare JP 3-13 has defined Computer Network Attack (CNA) as an 
operation to attack enemy networks to minimize its availability (e.g., disrupt, deny, 
degrade) and Computer Network Defense (CND) to minimize the enemy’s ability to 
degrade the United States military’s access to its network [JP 3-13].  For both of 
these operations, it is important to understand the effects of availability attacks on 
multiple networks in the same way the effects of kinetic attack on structure is 
known.  By knowing the effects of these attacks, the warfighter can study ways to 
circumvent threats against Air Force networks while planning effective attacks 
against the enemy’s systems. 
Availability attacks exist at every layer of the network stack for different 
types of network classes [BJJ07], [YaM03].  This thesis focuses on one availability 
attack at the network layer: the Black Hole attack for ad-hoc networks.  Ad-hoc 
networks provide data routing services to loosely coordinating groups or quick 
reactionary forces, making it essential for current and future Net-Centric 
Operations.  A Black Hole attack is a well-known denial of service availability attack 
for ad-hoc networks that deceptively attracts data to flow through nodes under 
control of an attacker.  As packets of data flow into the malicious node, they are 
silently dropped.  A highly successful Black Hole attack can prevent all data from 
3 
 
reaching its destination.  Therefore, this attack is a significant threat to Net-Centric 
Warfare because it causes isolation in this network. 
While the Black Hole attack is well known, it has not been extensively 
studied.  Of the existing research, most published work on Black Hole attacks 
involves measuring the effect of a Black Hole attack on protocols.  However, there 
has been no research on the effectiveness of attacks on different instances of ad-hoc 
networks (e.g., different number of nodes, density, diameter).  Moreover, there has 
been little research in understanding why the Black Hole attack is effective.  One 
exception is work performed by Andre König, who developed an analytical Black 
Hole model to predict performance loss incurred by the network under attack 
[KSS09].  However, his model is limited to an optional configuration of a single 
mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) protocol.  This thesis develops an analytical Black 
Hole attack model for ad-hoc topologies using reactive protocols that is 
complementary to König’s work in that it is more general and is based on proven 
theorems.    
1.1  Hypothesis and Goals 
The hypothesis is:  an analytical model can be used to predict the effect of 
Black Hole attacks on ad-hoc networks.  To test this hypothesis, the results of an 
analytical model can be compared against the measured effect of a Black Hole attack 
in a controlled experiment.  While previously developed analytical Black Hole 
models could be used in the experiment, there are several drawbacks to them that 
are covered in Section 2.3, which includes protocol applicability limitations and an 
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incomplete model for how the Black Hole attracts new routes.  One goal for this 
research effort is to develop a new analytical Black Hole model that overcomes the 
identified issues and provide an alternative method for assessing the impact of 
Black Hole attacks on networks.  A secondary goal is to identify an alternative 
method to the uniform density assumption to simplify analysis on ad-hoc topologies. 
1.2  Contributions 
This thesis contributes in several ways.  First, the performance constraints of 
a Black Hole attack are explored.  From this exploration, a theorem is developed for 
reactive MANET protocols that select routes with the smallest hop-count during 
route discovery, on the existence of an upper-bound on the degree of deception a 
Black Hole can offer for its route advertisement.  Assuming a Black Hole node will 
maximize its deceit to increase its chances as being selected for a route, an 
analytical model for Black Hole attack is developed based on this theorem that 
determines the probability that an arbitrary route in a network is subject to Black 
Hole packet dropping attack.  The model requires the neighbor hop-distance density 
function be known for the topology.  Since this function is unknown for ad-hoc 
topologies, the third contribution is the use of topology substitution to make the 
problem tractable.  A hypercube topology with similar network properties is 
substituted for an ad-hoc topology to derive an approximate hop-distance density 
function.  The fourth contribution is a method for finding the hop-distance density 
function for hypercubes given the network degree. 
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The academic impact of this contribution includes 1) greater understanding 
of the behavior of a Black Hole attack, 2) a new Black Hole attack model, and 3) an 
alternative topology approximation to the uniform density assumption to reduce the 
complexity of analysis for ad-hoc topologies.  The military impact involves the 
duality of assessing the impact of a potential weapon of war.  The military may 
utilize this model to evaluate the impact of Black Hole attacks on enemy systems for 
Computer Network Warfare.  Conversely, the military may also use the model to 
determine the susceptibility of Black Hole attacks on their systems and explore 
alternative network designs that minimize the risk. 
1.3  Structure of the Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is organized into six chapters.  Chapter II 
provides background material on ad-hoc networks, Black Hole attacks, and 
analytical models for Black Hole attacks.  Chapter III supplements the background 
research with a new theory for Black Hole attacks and ad-hoc topology 
approximation using hypercubes.  The two concepts are combined in this chapter to 
present a new analytical Black Hole attack model for hypercube topologies.  Chapter 
IV provides the methodology for establishing an experiment to test the accuracy of 
the analytical Black Hole attack model on ad-hoc topologies.  Chapter V presents 
and provides analysis of the results of the experiment.  Chapter VI summarizes the 
accomplishments, conclusions, and future work of this thesis. 
  
6 
 
II. Literature Review 
This chapter covers background material and prior work related to this 
research effort.  The chapter is structured as follows:  Section 2.1 contains 
background material on ad-hoc networks, a generalized architecture of ad-hoc 
routing, and two reactive routing protocols that comply with the assumptions of the 
analytical model.  Section 2.2 contains background information on the Black Hole 
network attack.  In Section 2.3, existing research is presented on Black Hole 
performance analysis using simulation, ad-hoc topology approximations for 
analytical models, and two analytical Black Hole attack models. 
2.1   Ad-Hoc Networks and Routing 
An ad-hoc routing service is comprised of four core components: 1) 
determining topology state, 2) calculating routes, 3) selecting a route, and 4) 
forwarding packets according to the selected route.  The relationship between these 
components is shown in Figure 1 [ZPY10].  The architecture represents the functions 
of the protocol as a system and therefore is not bound to the physical manifestation 
of a network.  This means that one node may contain all or some of the component 
functions or merely participate as a single component.  When combined, the protocol 
components provide two essential services.  First, Protocol Coordination provides 
control of the Path Information Base, which is a data structure that holds current 
routing rules and policy.  Second, Application Routing uses the Path Information 
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Base to route packets through the network.  The services provide a control and data 
channel respectively. 
 
Figure 1: Ad-hoc Routing Protocol Architecture.  Adapted from [ZPY 10] 
 
The predominant challenge for the Protocol Coordination Service is to realize 
and maintain the state of network topology while contending with confounding 
dynamics in the physical, RF, and logical domains.  Examples of dynamic events 
include node power failures, RF interference, and topology discovery on initial 
deployment.  Global awareness of these events is achieved through protocol 
coordination, through which participants discover and exchange local topology state 
with peers to identify potential routes.  During the Calculate Available Routes 
phase, feasible routes are realized using the updated topology state.  In the Select 
Routes phase, the best route or routes (i.e., for multicast) are selected according to 
the particular route metric specified in the protocol.  This subset of routes is stored 
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in the Path Information Base data structure (e.g., cache, routing table, etc.).  The 
Packet Routing component provides the second service, Application Routing, which 
routes packets according to the current rules and policies in the Path Information 
Base.  Thus, as the state of the Path Information Base changes, the routing behavior 
of the network will change. 
Ad-hoc routing protocols can be described in terms of five cross-cutting 
aspects over the architecture [OYM02].  These are 1) Routing Time, 2) Routing 
Direction, 3) Information Placement, 4) Routing Structure, and 5) Alternative Route, 
where each aspect has at least two alternatives.  For the Routing Time aspect, 
protocols can be proactive or reactive in how they maintain topology state through 
coordination.  Reactive protocols only coordinate when necessary, while proactive 
protocols coordinate periodically.  The tradeoff between reactive and proactive is 
between route setup time and bandwidth.  Proactive protocols have more 
deterministic route setup times at a cost of utilizing higher bandwidth [FZJ09].  
Reactive protocols utilize less bandwidth for control packets, but have higher 
variance in the route setup period [KiL07].  The aspect of Routing Direction 
describes the direction of a routing path with respect to the topology state 
dissemination direction (i.e., the direction that updated topology information travels 
with respect to the source node).  Therefore, the route direction is either with or 
against the dissemination direction.  The Information Placement aspect describes 
how the route is stored in the network.  Traditionally this has involved storing the 
next hop in forwarding tables at each node making routing hop-by-hop or 
alternatively the source node is responsible for maintaining the complete route.  The 
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Route Structure aspect describes whether the protocol assumes that all nodes do the 
same work (i.e., flat) or that there is a hierarchy of roles.  Finally, the Alternative 
Route aspect describes whether the protocol supports single-path or multipath 
packet routing. 
2.1.1   Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector Routing 
Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing  is a reactive routing, 
forward updating, hop-by-hop, flat, and single-path routing protocol [PBD03].  The 
protocol is broken into three services: 1) Route Discovery, 2) Route Repair, and 3) 
Packet Forwarding.  The Route Discovery process occurs when a source node desires 
to route to a destination.  The source node sends a route request (RREQ) packet that 
is flooded throughout the network via broadcast.  To minimize the effects of 
broadcast collisions, each node waits a random interval before initiating its 
broadcast of the RREQ.  As the RREQ is propagating the network, intermediate 
nodes append their ID to the RREQ and store a forwarding rule towards the source 
in preparation of a reply message.  When the destination, or an intermediate node 
that knows the forwarding path to the destination, receives a RREQ it responds with 
a route reply message (RREP).  The responding node places the path information 
collected during the RREQ into the RREP and sends it along the reverse path 
previously established during the RREQ flood to the source node.  Each node that 
receives the RREP adds the forwarding rule to their route table and forward the 
RREP toward the source.  Because of the flooding nature of a RREQ, the destination 
generates a RREP for each discovered path.   
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Route Repair consists of a detection event and response.  Along a forwarding 
path from a source to a destination, the transmitting node expects an 
acknowledgement packet for each forwarded packet.  If the node receiving the 
packet fails to respond, it may retry several times.  Upon repeat failures a route 
error (RERR) packet is generated along the reverse route of the failed packet back to 
the originating source node of the packet.  Each node that receives the RERR packet 
marks the forwarding rule pertaining to the broken route as having an infinite hop 
distance to the destination.  Upon receiving the forwarded RRER packet, the source 
node attempts to repair the route by initiating a new RREQ packet. 
Intermediate and source nodes receiving a RREQ, RREP, or RERR update 
their forwarding table if 1) the destination’s sequence number in the coordination 
message is higher than the one stored in their table, or 2) the destination’s sequence 
number is the same as the entry in its routing table, but the hop-count in the 
message is shorter.  Coordination messages containing higher destination sequence 
numbers imply fresher routing information.  
Sequence numbers are an important part of updating the topology.  Each 
node is responsible for maintaining the current value of its own sequence number.  A 
node updates its sequence number upon generating either a RREQ or RREP.  It 
places the new sequence number in the source sequence field for a RREQ and the 
destination sequence number field for a RREP.  These two events describe the 
majority of destination sequence updates for a network; however, there is a special 
case where an intermediate node increments its local copy of a destination’s 
sequence number.  This happens when a node detects a link failure and subsequent 
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RERR message.  The updated destination sequence number is included in the RERR 
message and since it is greater than the last known true destination sequence 
number, causes each downstream node to update its table before forwarding the 
RERR down the reverse path to the source.  The two independent sequence numbers 
represent the partition in the route, which is only corrected by the source node 
instigating another RREQ.  If the destination receives the new RREQ and sends a 
RREP, the resulting sequence number will always be equal or greater than the 
sequence number generated by the original sender of the RERR.  For the nodes that 
update their tables based on the RERR, if they receive a RREP with an equal 
destination sequence number they will still update their tables because any new and 
real route has a hop distance less than infinity. 
Packet forwarding is achieved via a distance vector table stored at each node 
in the network containing entries for each known destination.  For each destination, 
the node stores the next hop, distance in hops to the destination, and the sequence 
number of the latest update to the route.  When application packets arrive to be 
forwarded, the node examines the destination in the packet and determines the next 
hop using the appropriate entry in the routing table. 
2.1.2   Dynamic Source Routing 
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) is a reactive, forward updating, source-based, 
flat, and single-path routing protocol [JHM07].  Its route discovery and maintenance 
behavior is very similar to AODV; however, the major differences between the 
protocols are the manner of packet routing and how the routes are stored.  Unlike 
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AODV, the route is maintained completely by the source node in DSR.  The source 
node is responsible for generating the route request and has complete freedom to 
select any route reply to use when routing packets.  Instead of storing the route hop-
by-hop, DSR uses source routing where the source node places complete routing 
information in each application packet.  Each intermediate node along a route will 
use this information to determine the next hop.  The intent of the designers is to 
follow the analog of the TCP/IP fate sharing [Cla88] by placing the majority of the 
complexity burden at the end nodes.  With route selection at the end nodes (i.e., the 
source and destination nodes), inner nodes (i.e., the nodes that forward packets 
along the route between the source and destination) can be stateless.  This removes 
any need for inner node router memory [JHM07].  However, if all nodes fully 
implement DSR, the protocol uses route caching to minimize delay in learning a new 
route.  Nodes cache routes from 1) route responses to route requests, 2) source routes 
that have traversed through the node, and 3) overheard control messages from 
neighbors.  Upon receiving a route request packet that is requesting a route to 
another node, the intermediate node consults its cache to determine if they already 
know a route.  If a route is found in its cache then it generates a route reply rather 
than continue flooding the original route request message.  Similar to AODV, before 
broadcasting a RREQ, a node will wait a random amount of time to minimize that 
chance of a collision during broadcast.   
The route discovery process in DSR enables the source node to realize and 
cache multiple paths to a destination.  If the source receives a route error message 
on one of its routes, it can look in its cache to determine if an alternative route is 
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already known.  The Route Selection function in DSR is not defined in [JHM07], but 
rather, is left up to the implementation of the protocol.  The DSR simulation model 
in ns-2.34 [Net11] selects the route in the cache with the smallest hop count.  In 
picoNet [Son09], a Linux 2.4 Kernel module implementation of DSR, the shortest 
hop count route is selected from the route cache.  During a tie, the most current 
route entry of the shortest routes is selected.  The Monarch Project implementation 
of DSR for FreeBSD3.3 also selects the route in the cache with the lowest hop-count 
[Ric00].  All of these implementations select the route with the smallest hop-count. 
2.1.3  Generalization of Reactive Protocols 
One notable similarity with the majority of reactive routing protocols is the 
use of the route request and route reply exchange when establishing a new route.  
While DSR and AODV certainly do this, protocols such as Admission Control 
enabled On-demand Routing [KAD07] and Dynamic Manet On-demand Routing 
[ChP10] also utilize the route request flooding to find the destination followed by a 
route reply from the source.  Moreover, many other reactive protocols such as ones 
proposed in [KGA06] and [GoY02] are extensions of AODV and DSR.  These 
protocols provide minor improvements without significantly changing the request-
reply cycle.  Therefore, it is reasonable to assume the route discovery process in most 
reactive protocols exhibit the same behavior. 
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2.2   Black Hole Packet-Drop Attack 
A Black Hole attack is a low-observable indiscriminant active packet-
dropping attack [Lun00].  By silently dropping all received application packets 
intended for forwarding, a Black Hole packet-dropping node effectively denies end-
to-end routing service for all routes traversing through it.   To maximize its 
effectiveness, the packet-dropping node also participates in the coordination service 
of the routing protocol to coerce routes to include the packet-dropping node.  The 
coercion process involves falsifying coordination data to make the Black Hole node 
appear as a lucrative and valid choice during route selection.   Therefore, a Black 
Hole attack consists of two phases: 1) an attractor phase where coercion takes place 
and 2) an exploitation phase where packets are dropped from routes.  The effect on 
ad-hoc routing protocols is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Black Hole Attack on Ad-hoc Routing Protocols 
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During the attractor phase, the goal of the attack is to get routes to flow 
through Black Hole nodes.  This is accomplished by modifying the Path Information 
Base of the routing protocol, which is managed through the Protocol Coordination 
service.  The path that this low integrity routing data takes during the attractor 
phase follows the double-lined arrows in Figure 2.   
First, the attacker provides topology information so that the Black Hole node 
is perceived as being in at least one of the available routes, which is trivial.  Through 
coordination messages, the attacker simply declares that there is a path between 
each targeted source and destination node pair and each path passes through the 
Black Hole node.  For the purpose of calculating available routes, there is no 
difference whether the attacker indicates that the destination node is one hop or 
many hops away from the Black Hole; however, the information must be 
syntactically correct and not violate limits of the protocol.  For example, DSR has a 
maximum source-route length because of the limitations of the DSR source route 
header size.  A fabricated route that violates this limit would never be added to the 
Path Information Base and instead be silently dropped. 
Second, the attacker must make it likely that at least one of the routes 
containing the Black Hole is selected as the route that goes into the Path 
Information Base.  This critical part is handled during route selection and is protocol 
specific; however, many protocols use a routing metric to rank the fitness of each 
available route and select the fittest route to add to the Path Information Base.  
Examples of routing metrics include minimized hop count, maximized link quality 
over the route, maximized throughput, and minimized congestion.  The particular 
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routing metric used in a protocol can be design and implementation specific.  DSR 
and AODV both use the shortest hop-count for route selection provided sequence 
numbers in the RREP message are correct.   
There are several strategies for the attacker to offer a winning metric.  First, 
the attacker can observe legitimate node coordination of topology information to 
learn the best metric the network can offer about a route.  With this information the 
attacker can submit a route with a better metric that is guaranteed to be selected.  
However, it is not reasonable to assume that a node in a multi-hop network would 
always have complete visibility over all coordination messages in the network, so the 
attacker may not be able to learn the best route’s metric.  Instead, the attacker must 
estimate a good value from all available information.   
A simpler approach for the attacker is to exploit known boundaries of digital 
systems and submit the best possible value for a metric.  For example, the Black 
Hole attack in [DSE07] submitted the highest possible destination sequence number 
in a RREP to all route requests.  According to the AODV protocol, topology 
information in a RREP replaces local table information if the destination’s sequence 
number in the message is higher than the value stored in the nodes routing table.  
While this approach is simple and seemingly powerful, it still does not guarantee the 
Black Hole’s route will be selected.  There may be other available routes that 
coincidentally evaluate to the optimal value and thereby cause the protocol to defer 
to a secondary metric to break the tie.  For AODV, the tie-breaking metric is to 
select the route with the shortest hop-count.  Moreover, submitting the best possible 
metric value may be easily detected by more secure versions of the protocol.  In 
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[DhS08], the authors used the fact that sequence numbers generally increase by 
small amounts and modified AODV to discard RREP messages with destination 
sequence number significantly larger than expected.  Their analysis shows that this 
simple detection method avoided slightly less than half of Black Hole attacks.  This 
result leads to an insight on the limitation of Black Hole forgery of topology 
information: Black Holes cannot lie with impunity.  Instead, a stealthy Black Hole 
must balance the tradeoff of truth versus fiction by presenting fabricated, yet 
plausible, topology information that maximizes its utility during Route Selection.  
Black Hole constraints such as this are presented as new insights in Chapter III. 
The exploitation phase commences once a route with the Black Hole node is 
included in the Path Information Base.  This phase is very simple; the Black Hole 
conducts the denial of service attack on the route by dropping all packets instead of 
forwarding.  What makes this exploitation particularly effective is that at this stage 
of the route the Black Hole node has the sole responsibility to provide feedback to 
the maintainers of the route that the packet was dropped.  By silently dropping the 
packet the feedback loop is broken and downstream nodes will not be aware that 
packets are failing to arrive at the destination.  Some protocols on top of routing 
such as TCP provide a built-in feedback mechanism [Ste94], but since a Black Hole 
node is between both the source and destination it can forge a reply as if from the 
destination (e.g., ACK) to complete the feedback loop. 
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2.3   Modeling and Simulation of Black Holes in Ad-hoc Networks 
In this section, prior work related to the research topic is presented and 
evaluated.  In Section 2.3.1, the limitations of existing performance analysis 
measurements of Black Hole attacks are identified.  With respect to analytical 
modeling, existing ad-hoc topology approximations are summarized in Section 2.3.2 
and two analytical Black Hole models are presented in Section 2.3.3.  In these 
sections, the positive and negative aspects of the approaches are explored with the 
intent to guide the design for the analytical Black Hole model presented in Chapter 
III. 
2.3.1  Research in Network Performance under Black Hole attack 
The effect of Black Hole attacks on ad-hoc networks and MANET 
performance has been studied with controversy.  In [CPZ09] and [BhS09], the DSR 
protocol is subjected to Black Hole attacks in simulation.  Generally the results show 
a decrease in network throughput and packet delivery ratio as the number of Black 
Hole nodes increase.  Studies of Black Hole attacks on AODV also show a similar 
trend in performance loss in [DSE07] and [KSS09].  One matter of concern is that 
performance results of independent studies on the same protocol are not consistent 
with each other.  In König’s study, two Black Hole nodes dropped 75% of all packets; 
however, Dokurer reports that two Black Holes dropped only 50% of the packets, 
which is well outside of König’s confidence intervals.  In Cai’s study five Black Holes 
in a network reduced throughput by 30%; however in Bhalaji’s study, throughput is 
reduced by 20% for the same number of Black Holes.  Even more concerning is that 
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these performance results were used to demonstrate the effectiveness of their 
approach in avoiding Black Hole attacks.  Assuming these studies are not flawed, 
this implies that there is a relationship of Black Hole performance beyond protocol 
and number of Black Hole nodes. 
2.3.2   Prior Research in Topology Approximations of Ad-hoc Topologies 
Analytical models of ad-hoc networks involve topology assumptions to reduce 
analysis complexity of the topology graph.  In [Bet02] the author uses network 
density 
,      (1) 
to describe the topology, where n is the number of equal-distanced nodes placed in 
area A.  This allows problems to be solved geometrically, such as 1) the minimum 
node degree of a graph, 2) the minimum transmission range so that no node is 
isolated, and 3) the expected degree of a network.  The author identifies a 
discrepancy between simulation results and the analytical model.  He argues that 
the error is a result of the assumption in the analytical model that there is no 
border; however, simulations such as ns-2 utilize a border to bound the area nodes 
can be deployed and move.  The author suggests several ways to overcome the 
border effects in simulation including wrapping borders of the simulation to achieve 
a torus; however, adapting a simulation to fit an analytical model is counter-
constructive.  Assuming the simulation has been previously validated, it would be 
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more beneficial that the un-validated analytical model be adapted to consider border 
effects.  
Bettstetter used the same uniform density assumption in [BeE03] to derive 
the probability that two randomly selected nodes in a network are neighbors.  The 
authors were also able to derive an analytical model for the probability that two 
nodes are exactly two hops apart; however, they were unable to find a closed form 
derivation for the general case, where  is a random variable of the hop-distance 
between two randomly selected nodes in a network.  As a compromise, they provided 
statistical representation of the density function of H for hops greater than two.  The 
paper includes several bar graphs depicting the density functions of H for a variety 
of network densities. 
There is no published research using interconnection network topologies to 
approximate ad-hoc topologies.  Interconnection networks have been used for 
organizing processing elements in super computers for efficient parallelization of 
complex tasks and their network properties are well studied [Hwa93].  This domain 
is far removed from wireless ad-hoc systems with dynamic topologies and limited 
resources, so this thesis is the first time that the application of both domains has 
been examined. 
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2.3.3  Prior Research in Analytical Black Hole Models 
There are currently two analytical models for Black Hole attack in ad-hoc 
networks.  The following sections describe the models, identify limitations, and 
suggest improvements to the models. 
2.3.3.1   Aad’s Denial of Service Attack Model 
In [AHK08] an analytical model is presented to calculate network throughput 
under denial of service attacks; specifically these attacks are Jellyfish and Black 
Hole.  Their model estimates the availability of a network flow (i.e., a group of 
packets traversing a route) based the proportion of time the flow incurs zero 
throughput.  The expected time a route has zero throughput is calculated as the 
product of the probability that at least one malicious node is in an arbitrary route of 
a certain length and the expected correction time to expunge all malicious nodes 
from that route.  The correction time is based on the number of attempts to detect 
the attack, rediscover an alternative route, and repair for each malicious node in the 
route.  Given the expected interval of zero throughput, one can calculate availability 
as one minus the ratio of the time of zero throughput over the expected duration of 
the flow. 
There are two concerns about this analytical model.  First, the authors’ 
simplification of the route setup process could introduce error.  They assert that the 
probability a route h-hops in length has no malicious nodes is 1 , where p is 
the proportion of malicious nodes in the network.  While they did not specify the 
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probability distribution, this is a binomial experiment.  Parameter h is the number 
of binomial trials and random variable X is the number of malicious nodes added to 
the route.  The model is shown as a binomial distribution here 
0
0
1 1    (2) 
If the authors assume route setup is truly binomial then they also must 
assert that node selection for each hop of the route is “identical and independent” 
[MiA03].  Assuming routing protocols are loop free, each trial is not identical or 
independent because once a node is selected for a route it should not be selected 
later in the route.  Otherwise a routing loop has been introduced, which violates the 
common loop-free assumption of routing protocols.  Each node selection during route 
construction changes p because malicious and benign nodes are removed from the 
sample pool and placed in the route.  Since the authors’ derivation assumes a 
binomial distribution, then there are issues with the model.  A more appropriate 
distribution is the hypergeometric distribution which is used in König’s model in 
Section 2.3.3.2. 
Another concern regarding the manner of modeling route selection is that the 
effect of the attractor phase of a Black Hole attack is missing from the model.  In the 
model, the probability that a Black Hole node is selected in a route is entirely based 
on the proportion of Black Holes in the network.  While it is certainly intuitive that 
more malicious nodes increase the probability of selection, the model does not 
consider that a Black Hole will bias route selection so that it is more likely to be 
selected over other nodes.  Instead, the authors’ model assumes that the selection 
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probability is divided equally for all nodes.  These two shortcomings indicate that a 
simple Bernoulli experiment does completely explain the Black Hole attack effect.   
The third concern is that the authors assume that detection of a Black Hole 
attack is a matter of eventuality.  During the lifetime of a flow, any malicious nodes 
along the flow route will eventually be detected via 1) route diagnosis at the network 
layer, or 2) the use of the TCP feedback loop.  Since a Black Hole node silently drops 
packets, the network layer will always be unaware of the broken route and would 
not know to issue a repair.  Utilizing the transport layer instead of the network 
layer, the end-points of a TCP connection could measure throughput and terminate 
the route when throughput appears stalled.  In theory this detects the effect of a 
Black Hole attack; however, the measuring mechanism in this case is also under the 
control of the malicious node.  The proposed way for an endpoint to measure 
throughput is found in [CFG11], where the upper-bound of throughput is the 
maximum receive window size over the round-trip time (RTT).  Since the malicious 
node is situated between the endpoints, it is reasonable to assume that the malicious 
node could provide spoofed acknowledgements on sent segments back to the sender 
to keep RTT estimates nominal.  Given the normal RTT measurement, the 
connection appears to be working from the sender’s perspective and the route 
remains persistent even though packets are actually being dropped.   
While the authors’ detection methods of Black Hole nodes could be avoided, 
there is an open question if Black Hole nodes are detectable.  Several researchers 
propose detection methods revolving around a watch-dog system to monitor 
forwarding behavior to detect packet dropping, where the absence of forwarding 
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implies packet dropping.  Upstream nodes watch the downstream node to make sure 
they actually forward the packet in [TAC09] and [KHK09].  If they fail to forward 
several times they are blacklisted from participating in routes.  However, in 
[AHK04], it is shown that watchdogs can be fooled if the Black Hole forwards the 
message to a bogus neighbor.  An alternative detection method in [GAM07] detects 
the inconsistency between the falsified topology data presented by the Black Hole 
and the actual data for the Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) protocol.  They 
propose to distribute passive traffic sensors within the area of the network that 
detects local network traffic.  This information is forwarded to a centralized anomaly 
detection algorithm for outlier detection and blacklisting.  What is not clear is how 
the sensor network is immune from the same vulnerabilities as the MANET.  For 
example, the centralized detector must trust the reports from external sensors, 
which could be forged or disabled by a man-in-the-middle attack. 
The most promising approach to detect Black Hole nodes is to exploit the 
greedy nature of the Black Hole, where Black Holes desire to acquire many routes to 
maximize the network degradation effect.  In [PSA09], routing agents bait potential 
Black Hole nodes by initiating route discovery on non-existent nodes.  Normal nodes 
will not reply to a non-existing destination; however, a greedy Black Hole node will 
always reply.  Therefore requesting routes to bogus destinations over the entire 
network will reveal Black Holes in the network.   
For ad-hoc networks where nodes freely join or leave, it may be difficult to 
determine the set of bogus node IDs to use as lures.  Moreover, the Black Hole node 
could observe network traffic to learn which nodes are real and only respond to 
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future route requests about those nodes.  While it is reasonable to assume that more 
advanced baiting schemes could be used to find Black Holes, it is also reasonable to 
assume that more complex Black Hole attacks can be developed to hide from 
detection.  Therefore, the problem of detecting Black Holes remains to be solved. 
2.3.3.2  König’s Black Hole Attack Model 
A completely different Black Hole model is proposed in [KSS09] to model 
packet loss instead of throughput of an AODV MANET under a Black Hole attack.  
Like Bettstetter, König assumes uniform node density to simplify the topology to 
determine the number of nodes included in a given topology search area.  By letting 
the radius of this search area be a multiple of the transmission distance, one can 
geometrically determine the number of nodes reachable at each hop.  In addition, 
the search area factors in border effects.  While this addresses the problem 
Betstetter encountered with the uniform density assumption, the authors 
acknowledge that their method is not completely sufficient to describe the effects of 
borders on the route discovery process.   
Given the ability to estimate the number of nodes at each transmission hop, 
they model the optional AODV RREQ extension known as the expanding ring 
topology search.  The expanding ring search is an AODV extension that avoids the 
potential for wasted forwarding of RREQ messages beyond the destination in the 
base protocol.  The source node accomplishes this by iteratively sending out RREQ 
messages, where each iteration uses a higher time-to-live (TTL) value.  The source 
node starts with all one-hop neighbors and increases the TTL value on subsequent 
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RREQ messages until the destination is discovered or the expected end of the 
network is reached.   
Given the set of nodes included in the ith RREQ of the expanding ring search, 
König can find 1) the probability that at least one Black Hole and 2) the probability 
that the destination is within the search area.  The first probability is defined as 
1 	 	
1
   (3) 
where  is the total number of nodes that the RREQ traverses in the ith RREQ of 
the ring search.  There are  number of nodes in the network and Black 
Hole nodes.  Unless the RREQ has reached all benign nodes in the network, the 
probability that at least one Black Hole gets a RREQ in the ith ring search is the 
probability that does not contain all benign nodes.  This is the opposite of the 
probability that is completely comprised of benign nodes, which is simply the ratio 
of all possible benign selection events and all possible combinations of selection 
events. 
The second probability  is the number of new nodes (i.e., 	) 
reached in the ith RREQ over .  This is intuitive considering that while the ith 
search reaches  nodes,  have already been explored in previous ring search 
iterations and did not find the destination. 
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König asserts that the probability an arbitrary route is subject to a Black 
Hole attack is the summation of the conjunction of  and  for each 
iteration of the expanded ring search.  This is: 
∑ ∙ ,			     (4) 
There are several observations to note about the important work in [KSS09].  
First, the authors implicitly include the condition for a Black Hole to win a route in 
the expanded form of (4).  For the ith RREQ, the route is subject to Black Hole attack 
if there is at least one Black Hole in  and the destination node is one of the new 
nodes reached during the iteration.  In this model, a Black Hole contaminates the 
Path Information Base in response to a ,  from source s to destination d if 
there is at least one Black Hole with a hop count distance to the source node that is 
less than or equal to the hop count between the source and destination. While the 
authors do not explicitly identify this, it is intuitive when considering route selection 
of AODV.  Nodes that are closer to the source may respond faster to the source 
[DSE07], or more importantly, may be more likely to have a better routing metric 
(i.e., hop count) than the destination.  A Black Hole replying with a better metric 
than the destination will be selected instead of the destination.  Consequently, the 
Black Hole’s solicitation is added to the Path Information Base.  This condition is 
formalized as a theorem in Chapter III. 
Secondly, the authors either did not realize or convey that the expanding ring 
search sequence is very similar to the standard route request flooding process in 
AODV and DSR, which would greatly enhance the scope of their analytical model.  
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Because the distance to the destination is probabilistic in (4), the analytical model 
considers all possible hop distances to the destination.  For this reason, (4) could also 
model a single standard RREQ message that is flooded throughout the network 
when the distance to the destination is probabilistic.  Before the model can be 
applied, some assumptions have to be made.  First, instead of iterations, there are 
steps within the discovery process. Each step represents the state of a single RREQ 
flood having reached all neighbors s-hops away from the source.  At the beginning of 
the step s, ∆ 	receive a forwarded RREQ message [KSS09].  Each node in 
∆  processes and synchronously forwards the RREQ for step s+1.  By assuming each 
step is synchronized and forcing the step value to be incremented by one for each 
step, the calculation of  is the same as  for the expanding ring search.  A second 
assumption is that the reduction in the number of RREQ messages for the base 
AODV does not invalidate the model.  Given that König’s model does not consider 
temporal or bandwidth constraints, then substituting one RREQ for the multiple 
RREQ in the expanding ring search should not be an issue.  Given these 
assumptions, their model may be applied to model the standard route discovery 
process for AODV and DSR. 
The third insight into König’s analytical model is that the number of Black 
Holes in  is actually a hypergeometric random variable and is equivalent to the 
calculation of  when 	–	 .  Let B be a hypergeometric random 
variable for the number of Black Holes less than or equal to i hops from the source.  
In terms of a hypergeometric problem, let  be the population size,  be the 
sample size, and  be the proportion of the population with the desired trait.  
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The probability that there are exactly  Black-Holes closer than the destination to 
the source is: 
    (5) 
Only one Black Hole is necessary to win a route and begin dropping packets.  
If two Black Hole nodes ended up in the same route only one of them would actually 
drop the packets.  Let 1  be the probability that at least one Black Hole is in 
the  nodes reached in the ith RREQ.  By the axioms of probability this is equivalent 
to 1 0 .  Substituting 0 into (5) results in the derivation of (3), which 
reveals that König’s model is hypergeometric: 
1 0 1 1 ,  (6) 
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III. Analytical Model for Black Hole Attacks 
This chapter describes an analytical model to determine the effect of a Black 
Hole attack on a wireless ad-hoc network given a minimal set of parameters to 
describe the intensity of the attack on a network topology. 
The remaining sections in this chapter are organized as follows.  Section 3.1 
describes the assumptions that must hold for the model to produce valid results. 
Section 3.2 identifies the objectives and constraints of Black Hole attacks.  These 
limitations lead to the formulation of a generalized predicate that describes the 
condition when a Black Hole attack is successful, which is covered in Section 3.3.  
Unfortunately, the predicate requires a-priori knowledge about the relative positions 
of nodes in the network which makes evaluating the predicate against ad-hoc 
topologies difficult. Section 3.4 presents a solution to this problem by using a 
hypercube topology as an approximation to an ad-hoc topology.  The benefits and 
drawbacks of this approximation are described, and more importantly, a method for 
deriving the neighbor hop-distance density function for hypercubes is presented.  
Section 3.5 describes an analytical model for determining the probability a Black 
Hole node in a network successfully attracts an arbitrary route.  Section 3.6 reveals 
a simple model for determining the performance impact of Black Hole nodes 
deployed in a network by utilizing the attractor model from Section 3.4. 
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3.1  Analytical Model Assumptions 
This section declares assumptions made about the ad-hoc network for the 
analytical model.  They describe the assumed behavior of the topology, protocol, 
benign (i.e., non-malicious) nodes, and Black Hole nodes.  Because the analytical 
model is based on these assumptions, they bound the scope of this research.    
3.1.1  Topology Assumptions 
 The average node degree of the network is known a-priori. 
 Nodes are never added nor removed from the network.   
 The operating area is square and is fixed in surface area and origin. 
 Every node in the network has at least one neighbor (i.e., the network 
is not partitioned). 
 The nodes in an ad-hoc network are randomly placed in an area using 
uniformly random variables for each dimension. 
3.1.2  Protocol Assumptions 
 The ad-hoc network is using a reactive route protocol with a RREQ-
RREP cycle for topology discovery and update. 
 Route selection selects the route with the lowest hop count. 
 Each node in the network will receive every RREQ message. 
3.1.3  Benign Node Behavior Assumptions 
 All benign (i.e., non-malicious) nodes have equal probability of 
initiating a RREQ message to a randomly selected destination over 
the lifetime of the network. 
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 Benign nodes are unable to discriminate between other benign and 
Black Hole nodes.  Therefore, Black Hole nodes are treated as a 
normal protocol-compliant and trusted nodes by all benign nodes in 
the network. 
 The destination node is the only benign node that replies to a RREQ.  
This implies that no intermediate nodes provide replies from their 
local Path Information Base. 
3.1.4  Black Hole Node Behavior Assumptions 
 A Black Hole can predict and match the destination sequence number 
in a destination’s RREP in AODV. 
 A Black Hole node will always reply to a RREQ with a forged route. 
 A Black Hole node will drop all forwarded packets. 
 Black Hole nodes do not collude and are never a source or destination. 
3.2  Optimization of Black Hole Attacks for Reactive Protocols 
A Black Hole node cannot act with impunity in the network.  Instead, it is 
bound by what it wants to do versus what it is able to achieve.  This section explores 
the impact that constraints such as protocol, locality, topology, and physical have on 
the success of a Black Hole attack.  The objectives and constraints are used to bound 
the design of the analytical model.  While not all constraints are considered in the 
model, they are included below for completeness. 
3.2.1  Objectives of a Black Hole Attack 
The effective performance degradation of an ad-hoc network under Black 
Hole attack is based on how many routes the attacker can influence and the length 
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of time these routes remain in the Path Information Base. To maximize these 
values, the Black Hole must 1) respond to every possible RREQ, and 2) avoid 
behavior that prematurely ends a route’s lifetime.  If a Black Hole does not respond 
to a particular RREQ, then it has no chance of corrupting that route and it is 
blatantly in violation of the maximization objective.  Once a route has been 
corrupted, the Black Hole must avoid being detected, causing a routing error, or 
providing insufficient feedback to the source at higher layers of the protocol stack 
(e.g., TCP).  Any of these behaviors could cause the route to be torn down before the 
source was finished, minimizing the number of packets the Black Hole could have 
dropped.  Therefore, a Black Hole maximizes the number of routes it influences by 
responding to every RREQ packet and maximizes the route’s lifetime by being 
stealthy.   
3.2.2  Limitations on Receiving RREQ Messages 
The attacker must be able to participate in the Protocol Coordination service 
in order to have the opportunity to affect the availability of a network.  For reactive 
protocols, a Black Hole node must be aware that a route discovery instance has 
commenced.  This occurs when a Black Hole node receives a RREQ, but this is not 
guaranteed to happen.  Both AODV and DSR have built-in mechanisms to shorten 
the route setup time, which limits the extent that route requests are propagated.  
The conditions where a Black Hole may not receive a RREQ are listed below: 
1. A destination node never forwards a RREQ.  Instead it generates a 
reply when the RREQ is unique.  If a Black Hole node is in a position 
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where all paths to the source node pass through the destination, it will 
never receive an RREQ and the attack will fail against that particular 
route. 
2. AODV and DSR permit intermediate nodes to respond to a RREQ if 
they have a fresh answer in their cache or routing table.  The effect of 
a cache hit creates the same condition as the destination node.  If the 
Black Hole node is in a position where all paths to the source node 
pass through an intermediate node that incurs a cache hit, then the 
Black Hole node is prevented from receiving a RREQ message for that 
route. 
3. A ring search is used to limit the extent the route request is flooded. 
The search distance is controlled by the time to live (TTL) field in the 
IP header.  Starting at TTL=1, the source node can determine if any 
neighbors exactly one hop away have a route to the destination.  If 
this does not result in a route discovery, then the TTL is incremented 
and the search is repeated.  The search distance is monotonically 
increased until the route is discovered.  If the destination node or an 
intermediate node with a cache hit is fewer hops from the destination 
than the Black Hole, then it is prevented from receiving an RREQ for 
the route. 
The model ignores this constraint by assuming that every node receives a 
RREQ message.  However, by Theorem 2 in Section 3.3, because the intermediate or 
destination node is in between the source and Black Hole in each of these three 
conditions, a Black Hole attack will not occur.  This result is equivalent to the result 
that would occur if a Black Hole never receives the RREQ message. 
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3.2.3  Limitations on Protocol Compliance 
While the attacker can elicit behavior that is not protocol compliant, 
coordination messages must be protocol compliant to avoid being discarded by 
legitimate nodes.  Depending on the protocol, the Black Hole node must also submit 
correct contextual state data often in the form of sequence numbers so that the 
coordination messages are accepted by benign peers.  DSR and AODV use source 
sequence numbers to discriminate between different route discovery instances.  If a 
recipient receives a RREP with an incorrect source sequence number, it will silently 
discard the packet.   
Additionally, distance sequence vector protocols like AODV and DSDV use a 
destination sequence number as a quality of freshness in the topology updates (i.e., 
RREP).  Since a node will not accept a new coordination message from a peer if the 
sequence number in the message is lower than the sequence number it has stored 
from a previously accepted coordination message, a Black Hole node must learn, 
deduce, or predict correct sequence numbers to successfully coordinate with peers 
during the routing process. 
For example, a Black Hole can learn current destination sequence numbers of 
each peer by periodically attempting to establish a connection with each one of them.  
Each discovery process reveals the sequence numbers of the peer, which can be 
stored in a local repository for later mischief.  Additionally, this repository of 
sequence numbers can be maintained by eavesdropping on control packets of route 
discovery processes of neighbors.  In [KHK09], König suggests simply counting the 
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number of overheard RREQ messages from each node and placing that value in the 
forged RREP; however, this assumes that the Black Hole gets all RREQ about a 
destination.  While neither of these approaches guarantee the Black Hole has 
clairvoyance on the precise state of each potential destination, it will be able to 
estimate of destination sequence numbers that likely meet or exceed the true value 
without appearing excessive to anomaly detection methods such as those found in 
[DhS08]. 
The model developed in this thesis assumes that, for AODV, the destination’s 
sequence number is known by the Black Hole node and it provides a matching 
sequence number in its RREP to force route selection to be based on hop count.  This 
allows AODV behavior to match the Route Selection process in DSR. 
3.2.4  Availability Limitations on the Packet-Dropping Attack 
Ideally, the best a Black Hole node can achieve is to be included in every 
route that exists within a network.  However, a Black Hole node is subject to the 
same physical constraints (e.g., bandwidth, medium contention) as any other node.  
Therefore it may be physically impossible to achieve complete domination of the 
network because of self-imposed congestion. 
As a greedy Black Hole attracts more routes through itself, congestion at and 
around the Black Hole will increase.  Eventually the Black Hole node and 
surrounding neighbors will be unable to service packets at a rate exceeding the 
arrival rate due to increased contention for the wireless medium.  As a result, their 
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send queues will fill up and packets will incur excessive routing delays.  Worse, the 
delays could be so extreme that a node is unable to acknowledge receipt of a received 
packet causing a RERR to be generated and the Black Hole to lose control of a route 
under its dominion. 
Both localized congestion and RERRs leak information to other nodes that 
could be used to detect the presence of a Black Hole.  Moreover, the Black Hole node 
will have increased difficulty participating in coordination of new routes because 
coordination messages will be delayed or dropped in trying to traverse the congested 
region around the Black Hole node.  Ironically, an overly greedy and successful 
Black Hole node may actually perform a denial of service attack on itself.  By 
denying itself the ability to attract new routes, a Black Hole is unable to achieve the 
maximum theoretical effect described in Section 3.2.1. 
An attacker may mitigate the bottlenecking of traffic of a single Black Hole 
by deploying multiple Black Hole nodes throughout the network.  The drawback to 
this strategy is the attack complexity increases: it is more difficult to access a 
network, discreetly coordinate when necessary, and conceal the presence of a wide 
scale attack.  On the other hand, an increased presence of greedy Black Hole nodes 
means more chances for the attacker to bid on each route request. 
This model does not consider throughput limitations of Black Hole nodes.  
Instead, it permits the analysis of effect of multiple Black Hole nodes and assumes 
there is no upper limit to throughput for each Black Hole. 
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3.2.5  Limitations of Falsification in Coordination Messages 
For protocols such as AODV and DSR that select the route with the shortest 
hop-count, a Black Hole must fabricate the shortest hop-count route possible to 
maximize the chance its route is selected.  This section defines the shortest route a 
Black Hole can advertise that, if selected, will result in a packet dropping attack. 
Lemma 1:  To conduct a packet-dropping attack, a Black Hole node must 
advertise correct topology state data about the path between the source node and 
itself.   
Proof. Assume a Black Hole node submits false topology state data in a 
RREP.  In particular, the segment of the route between the source and the Black 
Hole does not reflect the true state of the topology.  Assume that the source selects 
the route advertised by the Black Hole and begins forwarding packets to the 
destination.  Since the segment between the source and Black Hole is false, packets 
will never arrive at the Black Hole.  If packets never arrive at the Black Hole, then 
they cannot be silently dropped.  Therefore, submitting an incorrect path between 
the source and Black Hole does not cause packets to be dropped.  By contrapositive, 
a Black Hole must submit correct topology state information between itself and the 
source node to be able to conduct a packet-dropping attack. 
Moreover, any protocol-compliant nodes along the forwarding path, including 
the source, before the Black Hole will identify the false path as a broken route and 
begin repairing or tearing it down.  This causes the route to be removed from the 
Path Information Base and consequently results in a reduced disruption effect.  
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While it could be argued that repeatedly causing routes to fail and be recalculated is 
a denial of service and energy depletion attack, it is not stealthy and is not a packet-
dropping attack.   
Lemma 2:  To conduct a packet-dropping attack, the advertised segment 
between the Black Hole node and the destination must start with the Black Hole 
node and end with the destination; however, any arbitrary path can be placed 
between these nodes. 
Proof. Assume Lemma 1 holds and all routes are loop-free.  Assume a Black 
Hole node submits arbitrary topology state data in a RREP.  If the segment between 
the Black Hole and destination does not start with the Black Hole, then because of 
the loop-free assumption, the segment of the route between the source and Black 
Hole also does not end with the Black Hole.  This violates Lemma 1, implying that a 
packet-dropping attack is impossible.  If the segment between the Black Hole and 
destination does not end with the destination, then the source will not select the 
route because the response to its RREQ failed to satisfy its routing query of a route 
to a given destination.  If it does not select the Black Hole’s route, a packet-dropping 
attack will never occur.  Finally, any arbitrary routing path can be placed between 
the Black Hole and the destination in the advertised route because the packet will 
be dropped by the Black Hole node before it is forwarded over the false section of the 
route.  
Theorem 1: The shortest path a Black Hole can solicit resulting in a packet-
dropping attack is the shortest path between the source and Black Hole plus one. 
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Proof. Assume Lemma 1 and 2 are true.  By Lemma 1 the path between the 
source and Black Hole must be correct, so the minimal path length of this segment is 
the shortest legitimate path between the source and Black Hole.  By Lemma 2, the 
path between the Black Hole and destination can be anything so long as it begins 
and ends with the Black Hole and destination.  The shortest route that satisfies this 
is when the Black Hole advertises that the destination is a one-hop neighbor.  
Therefore the minimum advertised path length for this segment is one hop.  When 
the two segments are combined, the shortest path that a Black Hole can advertise is 
the shortest real path between the source and Black Hole plus one hop to the 
destination. 
3.3  Black Hole Attack Predicate for Route Selection by Hop Count Metric 
Let  be the set of all nodes in an arbitrary ad-hoc network.  Let  be a set of 
Black Hole nodes, where B ⊂ N.  Let  be the subset of benign source, destination, or 
forwarding nodes in the network.  Let E ⊂ N and E ∩ B ∅ .  Let RREQ , ,  represent 
the ith route request from source node s ∈ E about a route to destination node d ∈ E.  
Let  be the number of unique real paths from  to .  Assume RREQ , ,  reaches 
every node in  and there is no caching by intermediate nodes.  Consequently, the 
source will receive  RREP messages from the destination and one RREP message 
from every Black Hole in .  Let set  with cardinality | | contain only Black Hole 
RREP messages.  Let set  with cardinality , E ∩ RB ∅ ,  contain legitimate 
responses from . 
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Lemma 3:  If there is a least one Black Hole where the distance to the source 
node plus one hop is less than the distance between the source and destination, then 
a route between the source and destination will be subject to Black Hole attack. 
Proof. Assume Theorem 1 is true.  Let min  be a function that returns the 
minimum hop count from a set of RREP messages. From the implementation of DSR 
and AODV, route selection selects the RREP with the lowest hop count.  Therefore, a 
route will be subject to Black Hole packet drop attack if: 
     (7) 
If a RREP in  exists that has a lower hop count than the shortest 
legitimate route from  to , the Black Hole’s route will be selected.  Let ,  be a 
function that returns the minimum hop distance between arbitrary nodes  and .   
The shortest legitimate path from the source to the destination is the route in  
with the minimum hop count, or , .  From Theorem 1, the shortest 
path a Black Hole can solicit is the shortest path between the source and Black Hole 
plus one hop, or , 1.  A route will be subject to Black Hole attack if at least 
one Black Hole’s minimal route is shorter than the shortest distance between the 
source and destination.  That is, 
∃ ∈ 	 , 1 , → 	     (8) 
Lemma 4:  Consider the special case where predicate in (8) is false but there 
exists a Black Hole whose distance to the source node plus one hop is equal to the 
shortest path between the source and destination.  For this case, a route from the 
source to the destination will be subject to Black Hole Attack. 
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Proof.  Assume  ∃ ∈ 	 , 1 ,  is true.  By design and 
implementation of AODV and DSR, when two RREPs arrive with the minimum hop 
count, the first RREP to arrive is selected.  Since hop count is a non-negative 
integer, if ∃ ∈ 	 , 1 ,  is true then ∃ ∈ 	 , ,  is also 
true.  This implies that if the shortest route solicited by a Black Hole is equal to the 
shortest path between the source and destination, then the Black Hole node is closer 
to the source than the destination is to the source.  Assuming homogeneous 
congestion throughout the network, no route caching by inner nodes, and ignoring 
the effects of random delays incurred at each node to minimize broadcast collisions, 
a route reply sent by Black Hole b will arrive before the destination node’s route 
reply because the Black Hole has fewer hops to traverse than the destination.    
Since the Black Hole’s RREP arrives first, its route will be selected over the 
legitimate route. 
Theorem 2:  A route from a source to a destination will be subject to Black 
Hole attack if the Black Hole is closer to the source node than the destination to the 
source.  That is 
∃ ∈ 	 , , → 	 	    (9) 
Proof. By combining Lemma 3 and 4, a route is subject to Black Hole attack if 
∃ ∈ 	 , 1 , .  Since hop count is a positive integer, if this predicate is 
true then  ∃ ∈ 	 , ,  is also true. 
This predicate identifies that a Black Hole’s ability to corrupt routes is based 
on its relative locality with respect to the source and destination.  If the Black Hole 
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is closer to the source than the destination, it will corrupt a route.  While this is 
elegant, it introduces a challenge of determining the relative hop distances between 
the source, destination, and each Black Hole node in the network.  Given that the 
topology and positions of each Black Hole is known, each possible source-destination 
combination can be evaluated on its susceptibility against a Black Hole using the 
predicate in (9).  In this case, the probability of attack is the total number of source-
destination pairs where the predicate is true, over the total number of possible 
source-destination pairs.  Assuming each route has equal traffic load, then this is 
also the expected portion of network traffic dropped due to Black Hole attack. 
Unfortunately, the purpose of an ad-hoc network limits the feasibility of 
knowing the topology state a-priori; however, the constraints of knowing the exact 
relative distances of a particular topology could be relaxed.  In this case, the relative 
distances between neighbors can be represented by a probability distribution.  Given 
this information, the probability the predicate in (9) is true can be calculated. 
The derivation of the probability density function of the relative hop-
distances between neighbors for ad-hoc topologies has not been achieved.  While the 
derivation has been attempted without success in [BeE03], the author instead elects 
to derive the distribution statistically by sampling randomly generated ad-hoc 
topologies with similar properties as the target network.  While this approach is 
reasonable for high-fidelity calculations, it may be excessive for low-fidelity 
calculations.  To keep analysis in the theoretical domain, an alternative approach 
that this thesis is proposing is to find a theoretical network topology where 1) the 
probability density function for relative hop-distances can be calculated, and 2) its 
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structure is similar to an ad-hoc network topology.  Given these conditions, the hop-
distance density function of the theoretical topology can be substituted as the 
density function of an ad-hoc network of similar properties.  This substitution allows 
(9) to be approximated probabilistically for ad-hoc networks.    
3.4  The Hypercube Topology Approximation for Ad-Hoc Topologies 
This research assumes that a hypercube is a good representation for ad-hoc 
topologies with the same average node degree because 1) the neighbor hop-distance 
can be derived, and 2) the density function is close to the statistical results in 
[BeE03].  The properties of a hypercube (a.k.a., binary n-cube) are well known and 
presented in [SaS88] and [Hwa93].  While there are other potential candidates for 
topology substitution, such as a k-ary n-cube, torus, or n-ary tree, exploration of  
these topologies is left as future work.   
The remaining sub-sections of Section 3.4 are as follows.  Section 3.4.1 and 
3.4.2 describe the benefits and drawbacks of applying this topology to approximate 
an ad-hoc topology.  Section 3.4.3 describes a hop count frequency function for 
hypercube topologies.  This is used to find the probability that a neighbor is h-hops 
from a reference node. 
3.4.1   Benefits of Hypercube Topology Approximation 
The primary benefit for using a hypercube approximation is that the 
approximation makes the problem of finding the probabilistic distances between the 
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source, destination, and Black Holes computable.  The following paragraphs in this 
section elucidate the specific benefits. 
First, a hypercube can compactly be described by n, which is the node degree 
at each node.  When mapping from ad-hoc topologies to a hypercube, the average 
node degree is the only information required to generate a hypercube approximation 
of the ad-hoc topology.  This simplifies the effort of characterizing the parameters of 
the ad-hoc network under study. 
Second, hypercubes are symmetric, which reduces the complexity of the 
analysis with respect to a reference node.  Ignoring the identities of each node, the 
perspective of the topology from any particular node is no different than any other 
node.   This permits the analysis from a single arbitrary source node (a.k.a. 
reference node) to apply to any possible source node in the hypercube.   Instead of 
evaluating (9) for all possible source-destination pairs, (9) is evaluated for a single 
reference node against all possible destinations. 
Third, since the topology is well-defined, the probability that nodes are h-
hops away can be computed.  This precisely solves the issue presented in Section 3.3.  
With the probabilities for neighbors being h-hops away, the relative positions 
between a source, the Black Hole nodes, and the destination can be evaluated.  The 
method for deriving the hop distance density function is described in Section 3.4.3. 
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3.4.2   Drawbacks of Hypercube Topology Approximation 
Because the hypercube is approximating an ad-hoc topology, the accuracy of 
the analysis on the hypercube largely depends on how well it represents the ad-hoc 
topology.  The following paragraphs describe how a hypercube topology may behave 
differently than an ad-hoc topology. 
First, there are downsides to the compact description of a hypercube.  For 
hypercubes, network properties such as number of nodes and network diameter are 
a function of the node degree.  This rigidity makes approximating ad-hoc networks 
with disjoint network parameters difficult.  For example, assume that there is a 
network with average node degree, number of nodes, and network diameter of 3, 
128, and 25 respectively.  A 3-cube, 7-cube, and 25-cube each match one of the ad-
hoc network parameters while missing the others.  Moreover, there is no hypercube 
topology that satisfies degree 3, number of nodes 128, and diameter 25.  It is 
reasonable to expect errors in an analytical model using this topology approximation 
when the ad-hoc topology does not conform to the interrelationship defined by the 
hypercube topology definition. 
Second, it is possible for an ad-hoc network to be partitioned, especially for 
sparsely deployed networks.  By the definition of a hypercube, the topology cannot 
accommodate partitions and errors are expected to be introduced when using a 
hypercube topology to approximate a partitioned network.  Each partition could 
become an independent hypercube topology and analyzed separately, but this would 
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require more information for analysis beyond average node degree and number of 
Black Holes. 
Third, a hypercube topology has a uniform node degree, but this cannot occur 
along the border of the area an ad-hoc network is deployed.  From [Bet02], a border 
effect was noticed when simulating ad-hoc topologies in a 2-D area that violated the 
author’s uniform density assumption.  The density of a network is lower along the 
borders of the operating area because these nodes have a portion of their 
transmission area is outside of the operating area.  Therefore, nodes in this region 
have a reduced number of neighbors and, as a consequence, the density is lower than 
the average density in the network.  It is expected that the hypercube topology 
approximation will cause errors in analysis when nodes on the border deviate 
significantly from the central tendency of the network. 
3.4.3  The Hop-Distance Frequency Function for Hypercube Topologies 
Let ,  be a function that computes the number of neighbors that are 
- hops from a reference node in an n-cube (a.k.a., hypercube).  Function ,  is 
piecewise linear and recurrent. 
,
1, 0
, 1 1, 1 , 0
0,
  (10) 
Since hop count is a positive integer and bounded by the order of the 
hypercube, every h is mapped to one of three conditions.  Function ,  
recursively expands until all branches terminate on conditions 0 or 	 	  
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resulting in either a 1 or 0 respectively.  The summation of each leaf is the total 
number of neighbors in an n-cube that are exactly h-hops from the reference node. 
Each condition is described as follows.  First, the condition 0 represents 
an identity.  There is always one node zero hops away from a point of reference in a 
graph, which is the node itself.  The 	 	  condition is an impossible event by 
definition of a hypercube because a neighbor’s hop-distance cannot exceed the 
diameter of the topology, which is n [Hwa93].   
The remaining condition achieves the bulk of the work by dividing problems 
into rudimentary computable units.  Each recursion of this condition divides the n-
cube neighbor frequency problem into two 1 -cube sub-problems.  Because a 
hypercube is a binary n-cube, a hypercube can be described as two symmetric 
1 -cubes.  However, the two lower-ordered hypercubes must be joined before they 
become an n-cube.  By adding a binding link between each pair of symmetric nodes 
located in each 1 -cube, the structure becomes an n-cube.  Figure 3 illustrates 
this compositional property for a 2-cube, 3-cube, and 4-cube.  For each structure, the 
dashed lines represent the binding links.   
 
Figure 3: Two-hop neighbors in a 2-cube, 3-cube, and 4-cube topology 
49 
 
 
Given this compositional property that each n-cube is comprised of two 
1 -cubes, the number of neighbors -hops away can be generalized as the 
addition of the number of h-hop neighbors in each lower-ordered hypercube with 
respect to the same reference node.  The first sub-problem (i.e.,	 , 1 ) 
addresses the 1 -cube containing the reference node.  Because of the 
compositional property, -hop neighbors in an 1 -cube are also -hop neighbors 
in an n-cube.  Therefore, the -hop neighbors in an n-cube should at least be as 
many neighbors as -hop neighbors in an 1 -cube. 
The second sub-problem (i.e.,	 1, 1 ) addresses the question of 
how many -hop neighbors of the reference node are added if the reference node uses 
its binding link to reach the symmetric 1  cube.  Let the symmetric reference 
node be the adjacent node to the reference node through its binding link.  Because of 
the one hop between the reference node and its symmetric reference node, the 
number of h-hop neighbors for the reference node in the symmetric 1 -cube is 
the same as the number of 1 neighbors for the symmetric reference node in the 
symmetric 1 -cube.  Adding this sub-problem to the first sub-problem is 
, 	 , 1 1, 1 , which is the recursion relationship 
defined in (10). 
Figure 3 illustrates the recursive expression for finding all two-hop neighbors 
in a 3-cube and 4-cube.  The black node in each structure denotes the reference node.  
All gray nodes are the two-hop neighbors of the reference node and each double line 
indicates a shortest path from the reference node to each two-hop neighbor.  Using 
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the recurrence relationship, the number of two-hop neighbors in a 3-cube is the sum 
of the number of two-hop neighbors in a 2-cube plus the number of one-hop 
neighbors the adjacent 2-cube.  It is easy to see that a 2-cube has only one two-hop 
neighbor (i.e., 2,2 1).  There are two one-hop neighbors in a 2-cube so by 
(10), 3,2 2,2 2,1 3.  Likewise, a 4-cube has the same two-hop 
neighbors as a 3-cube (i.e., 3,2 3) plus all one-hop neighbors in a 3-cube.  
Since there are three one-hop neighbors in a 3-cube, then there are 4,2
3,2 3,1 6 two-hop neighbors for a 4-cube. 
Table 1 shows the computation of ,  for all possible hop-counts for n-
cubes where 1	 	10.  Each row represents the neighbor hop-distance 
frequencies for a particular n-cube and each element in a row is the number of 
neighbors h-hops from a reference node. 
 
Table 1: Neighbor Hop Distance Frequencies for Hypercubes 
n\h 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 1 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 1 4 6 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 1 5 10 10 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 
6 1 6 15 20 15 6 1 0 0 0 0 
7 1 7 21 35 35 21 7 1 0 0 0 
8 1 8 28 56 70 56 28 8 1 0 0 
9 1 9 36 84 126 126 84 36 9 1 0 
10 1 10 45 120 210 252 210 120 45 10 1 
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There are two things of interest to point out using Table 1.  First, it is easy to 
see the recursive relationship between n-cubes.  Any element at row n and column h 
is the sum of row 1 column h and row 1 column 1.  Second, each row is 
symmetrical, requiring only half that of the elements actually be calculated. 
3.4.4  Hop-Distance Density Function for Hypercubes 
Given the frequency function for hypercubes, the derivation of the hop 
distance density function is trivial.  It is simply 
,
| |
     (11) 
For example, finding the probability that an arbitrary node in an 5-cube is more 
than three hops from the reference node is .  This is because 3 4
5 , 4 , and  5 .  However, to use the density function to 
determine the probability that an arbitrary destination is h-hops away, the random 
selection must not include the reference node.  In this case, it is an impossible event 
for a destination to be 0 hops away.  Letting the reference node be a source node 
leaves | | 1 possible destination nodes.  The density function for finding the 
probability a randomly selected neighbor is h-hops away in an n-cube is 
,
| |
, 0
0, 0
     (12) 
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3.4.5  Comparison of Hop-Distance Density Functions 
Because of the previous work in [Bet02], the measured density function of an 
ad-hoc topology can be compared with a theoretical hypercubes’ density function to 
evaluated compatibility.  Figure 4 shows the comparison of density functions for 
Bettstetter’s derivation for a 100 node network, assuming a transmission distance of 
250m and an area of 1250m2.  Using the method described in Section 4.2.4, this 
network has an average degree of 10.  Since there are no hypercubes with 100 nodes 
and degree 10, the hop-distance density function is derived for two hypercubes.  One 
hypercube matches the ad-hoc network’s node degree and the other approximately 
matches the number of nodes as a 7-cube (i.e., 128 nodes). 
 
Figure 4: Comparison of Hop-Distance Density Functions 
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The three lines on the figure show the density functions for 1) the measured 
ad-hoc topology, 2) a hypercube with the same average node degree as the ad-hoc 
topology, and 3) a hypercube with the same number of nodes as the ad-hoc topology.  
In both cases, the hypercube distributions do not match the distribution of the ad-
hoc topology, but they may be reasonably close for the purpose of evaluating Black 
Hole attack effectiveness; however, more significant experimentation is required for 
conclusive evidence. The figure also suggests that a hypercube with the same 
number of nodes approximates the mean and a hypercube with matching average 
node degree approximates the variance of the ad-hoc topology respectively.  While 
this is interesting, it is left as future work to explore, test, and confirm.   
3.5  Analytical Black Hole Model for Attractor Phase 
Given that a route is being established, an analytical model for the attractor 
phase of a Black Hole attack determines the probability that the route selected by 
the protocol is one of the routes submitted by the Black Hole nodes in the network. 
Let  be the probability that a route solicited by a Black Hole is selected as 
the route between an arbitrary source and destination in a network.  In other words, 
let  be the probability that the predicate in (9) is true for an arbitrary source-
destination pair.  Let H be a random variable describing the distance between a 
randomly selected source and destination pair, where 1 . 
Since 
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1 2 ⋯ 1 
Then 
1 2 ⋯  
1 	 2 ⋯  
Applying the conditional probability rule 
| 1 1 | 2 2 ⋯ |  
In general 
∑ | ,     (13) 
which is comprised of two parts.  First,  is the probability that the 
destination is h-hops away.  This has already been derived for hypercube topologies 
in (12); however, hop-distance density functions for other compatible topologies could 
also be used to find  as they are discovered in future work. 
|  is the probability of a Black Hole attack given that the distance 
between the source and destination is  hops.  To find this probability, it can be 
mapped to a hypergeometric distribution.  For a hypergeometric distribution, there 
are a number of items in a pool, where a known quantity of items have a desired 
trait and the remaining proportion of the population does not.  A hypergeometric 
experiment consists of sampling a subset of the items from the total pool of items.  A 
hypergeometric random variable is the number of sampled items that have the 
desired trait.   
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Let the hypergeometric experiment be a route discovery attempt by a source 
to a destination node that is -hops from the source.  Let the pool be the number of 
nodes in the network excluding the source and destination node.  From Theorem 2, 
let the desired trait be all nodes closer to the source than the destination is to the 
source.  Let  be the number of nodes having the desired trait in the network.  Since 
the destination is -hops from the source, this is simply 
∑ , , 1
0, 1
     (14) 
Let the number of sampled items in the hypergeometric experiment be the 
number of Black Hole nodes in the network.  Finally, Let  be a hypergeometric 
random variable of the number of Black Hole nodes having the desired trait.  In 
general, the probability that exactly  Black Hole nodes are closer than the 
destination is 
|	
| |
| |
| |
| |
    (15) 
From [MiA03], this hypergeometric distribution is subject to the constraint 
max	0, | | | | 2 min	 | |,   (16) 
From Theorem 2, a Black Hole attack will occur if at least one Black Hole has 
the desired trait.  Therefore 
| 1|     (17) 
As a hypergeometric  problem, |  is equivalent to 
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1| 1 0| 1
| |
| |
| |
| |
   (18) 
Substituting (18) and (12) into (13) reveals the analytical Black Hole attack 
model for hypercube topologies: 
∑ 1
| |
| |
| |
| |
,
| |
    (19) 
Because 0 in (18), both (18) and (19) are valid only when 
max	0, | | | | 2 0 min	 | |,    (20) 
3.5.1  Attractor Model Example Computation 
This model can find the probability a route discovery process is corrupted by 
a Black Hole given the dimensionality of the hypercube and the number of Black 
Holes.  For example, let there be three Black Hole nodes in a 4-cube.  In this case,  
can exist from one to four, the cardinality of  is 16, and the cardinality of  is 3.  
For the case where 1, Equation (14) indicates that  0 because no neighbors 
can be closer than one hop from the source node and from Table 1 1,4 4.  
Therefore for 1 
| 1 1
| | 2
| |
| | 2
| |
,
| | 1
1
14
3
14
3
4	
15
0 
For 2 
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| 2 1
10
3
14
3
6	
15
0.268 
For	 3 
| 3 1
4
3
14
3
4	
15
0.264 
For 4 
max 0, | | | | 2 3 
and 
min | |, 3 
For 4	the predicate in (20) is false because 3 0 3 is not true. This 
means that the hypergeometric distribution cannot be used.  Fortunately, 
calculating | 4  for this condition is trivial.  Table 1 indicates that when  
all remaining nodes (i.e., | | 2) are between the source and destination.  
Therefore	 | 4 1	and in general | 1.  With this knowledge, for 
4		
| 4 1 ∗
1	
15
0.066 
The resulting summation for all  is 0.598.  This means that 
approximately 60% of routes in the hypercube network will fall victim to a Black 
Hole attack. 
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3.5.2  Analytical Results of Attractor Model 
Figure 5 shows the analytical results using the Attractor Model for 
hypercubes of orders ranging from 5 to 30 and 0 | | 15.  For clarity, only 
hypercubes of orders divisible by five are depicted.  The x-axis of the figure indicates 
the number of Black Hole nodes in the hypercube.  The y-axis is  and each line 
shows  for a given hypercube and number of Black Hole nodes. 
 
Figure 5:  Attractor Model Results 
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The results in Figure 5 reveal several things.  First, as either the order of the 
hypercube or the number of Black Hole nodes increase,  increases.  While it is 
intuitive that increasing the number of Black Holes increases performance, the 
relationship between the order of the hypercube and  is more elusive.  The 
model indicates that Black Hole nodes benefit more from higher degree, more nodes, 
and an increasing diameter more than the destination.  A larger  provides slightly 
more opportunities to be closer to the source than the destination. 
A second observation is that as the number of Black Holes and the order of 
the hypercube increases, the relative performance gain of  decreases. As these 
parameters increase,  converges on a maximal value.  The significance of this is 
that a theoretical upper-bound may be identified given one parameter is fixed and 
the other is a free variable.  For example given five Black Holes, the best  
regardless of the hypercube order converges upon 79%.  Alternatively the upper-
bound probability of Black Hole attack given a hypercube of order 30 converges on 
95%. 
3.6  A Simple Model for the Exploitation Phase in Hypercube Networks 
Given that one knew with certainty which routes are under Black Hole 
attack, then the performance degradation is simply the proportion of traffic 
transmitted over the corrupted routes versus all forwarded packets in the network.  
However, the analytical model presented in Section 3.5 only determines the 
probability a randomly selected route in a network is subject to Black Hole attack 
and does not identify which particular routes are corruptible.  Therefore, this simple 
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model applies the Attractor Phase model to determine packet loss at the network 
level.   
Let  be a random variable for the number of routes in the lifetime of a 
network.  Let  be a binomial random variable representing the number of 
successful routes commandeered by a Black Hole attack.  The density function for  
is 
1     (21) 
For C to be binomial, it is assumed that the number of routes in a network is 
fixed, routes that are formed do not affect  for subsequently formed routes, and 
all non-malicious nodes have equal probability of becoming a source or destination in 
a given route. 
Since  is binomial, the expected number of routes taken over is 
     (22) 
Let  and  be random variables for the number of packets transmitted by 
the source and the number of packets dropped by Black Hole attack respectively in 
an arbitrary route.  The relationship between these random variables is  
      (23) 
Let  be a random variable for the total number of packets dropped by a 
Black Hole attack for all routes.  The overall network effect of a Black Hole attack is 
simply 
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     (24) 
For example, using the example calculation from Section 3.5.1, let 
0.598.  Let 8 and 4000.  Table 2 shows the densities for .  From this 
distribution, questions can be answered about the probability that a certain number 
of routes in the network will be subject to Black Hole attack.  For example, the 
probability that at least one route is subject to Black Hole attack is 
1 1 0 0.999 
 
Table 2:  Density of , 0 8 
0 6.82 10
1 8.12 10
2 4.23 10
3 1.26 10
4 2.34 10
5 2.78 10
6 2.07 10
7 8.79 10
8 1.63 10
 
The expected number of routes under attack for this network is 
4.78	  
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The expected number of packets dropped by Black Hole attack for an 
arbitrary route is 
2392	  
The expected overall effect a Black Hole attack for the network is 
19120	 	  
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IV. Methodology 
An experiment is conducted to test the hypothesis that the analytical Black 
Hole Attractor Model derived in Chapter III can determine performance loss of ad-
hoc networks.  Simulation is the most appropriate method for experimentation 
because it would otherwise be very expensive to setup, validate, and test enough real 
ad-hoc topologies to make statistical inferences about the hypothesis.   
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section 4.1 describes 
the system under test for the experiment.  This includes which component is being 
tested, the implementation of the Black Hole simulation models, and a small 
experiment to validate the implementations.  Section 4.2 describes the experiment 
design, methodology, and a brief narrative describing the process.  
4.1  System Under Test 
The system under test for this experiment is a wireless ad-hoc network that 
is simulated using Network Simulator 2.34 [Net11].  The network contains a known 
number of nodes deployed randomly in an area using the setdest program, which is 
included in the simulation package.  Setdest places nodes in an area by sampling the 
Cartesian coordinates from uniformly random variables.  Once placed, each node 
remains in its position for the duration of the simulation.   
Each wireless ad-hoc node in the network is a simulation model, which is 
comprised of an antenna, radio, propagation model, and a protocol stack to 
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communicate with each other in Network Simulation 2.34 (a.k.a., ns-2).  Specifically, 
the stack is comprised of an omni-directional antenna with unity gain, a 914MHz 
Lucent WaveLAN DSSS radio, an implementation of IEEE 802.11 Medium Access 
Control (MAC) layer, and a reactive MANET routing protocol.  The stack enables 
each node to provide packet routing for the wireless ad-hoc network.  Besides basic 
routing services, some nodes are designated as application end-points, which send or 
receive constant bit-rate (CBR) traffic.  A Black Hole is a node with a modified 
MANET routing protocol designed to conduct Black Hole attacks and is never an 
application end-point. 
4.1.1  Component Under Test 
The component under test for this experiment is a route in an ad-hoc 
network.  The treatment on the route is the relative locations of the source, 
destination, and Black Hole nodes that participate in the route discovery process.  
Since the ad-hoc topologies are randomly generated, treatment is random for all 
routes under test. 
For each randomly generated topology, every possible source and destination 
pair is tested to see if it is subject to Black Hole attack.  This exhaustive method is 
preferred over random sampling because 1) the population of possible routes is small 
because of the low number of nodes, and 2) random sampling of source-destination 
pairs introduces an additional level of randomness.  The additional randomness 
confounds the effects of the intentionally random treatment, so it is avoided.  The 
frequency of Black Hole attacks collected during treatment for every source-
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destination pair over multiple ad-hoc topologies is compared with the predictions of 
the analytical attractor model to evaluate its accuracy. 
One confounding source of randomness in the component under test is the 
random delay incurred at each hop of a RREQ broadcast.  The random delay 
minimizes the risk of collisions between two neighbors that hear the same RREQ 
and rebroadcast it at the same time.  Broadcast collisions are not detected by IEEE 
802.11, so this random delay must exist to avoid nodes disrupting their neighbors’ 
rebroadcast of the RREQ.  The consequence of this randomness is that a node may 
receive a RREQ after another node with a larger hop-distance to the source node.  
While this does not affect Lemma 3, the behavior does not fit the assumptions in 
Lemma 4 and consequently Theorem 2.  As a result, there is some probability that 
Theorem 2 does not hold for an arbitrary route in a network that uses a reactive 
MANET protocol.  This experiment accounts for the unwanted randomness by 
treating it as sampling bias, which is alleviated by selecting the appropriate number 
of experiment replications.  The process for this is covered in Section 4.2.3; however, 
quantifying the probability of that a node receives a RREQ after a node with a 
greater hop-count to the source should be studied in future work and applied to this 
model. 
4.1.2  Black Hole Node Implementation 
Two Black Hole Attack simulation models are implemented for ns-2 by 
extending the AODV and DSR protocol simulation models included in the ns-2 
distribution. 
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4.1.2.1  DSR Black Hole 
A DSR Black Hole listens on its radio interface for arriving packets.  When a 
packet arrives, it handles it in one of several ways, depending on the packet type.  If 
the packet is a RREQ packet, it immediately generates a false source route to the 
requestor.  This is accomplished by generating a RREP packet with the destination 
of the RREQ set as the source of the RREP.  Before copying the source route in the 
RREQ packet, the Black Hole node appends itself and the destination to the route.  
It places the reverse of the resulting route in the spoofed RREP packet and then 
places it in its send queue.  This behavior implements the Attractor Phase discussed 
in Section 2.2. 
If the arriving packet is not a DSR protocol coordination packet, but rather 
an application packet to be forwarded, it silently drops the packet.  This behavior 
implements the Exploitation Phase discussed in Section 2.2. 
The Black Hole node is a protocol compliant DSR implementation for all 
other packets.  To accomplish this, the node’s cache must not be tainted with false 
routing information.  Therefore, the Black Hole node only stores the correct portion 
of the reverse source route in its cache (i.e., the segment between the source and 
Black Hole node).  Second, the Black Hole node avoids cache snooping (i.e., placing 
overheard source routes in its cache) because the Black Hole cannot be certain that 
an overheard route is a valid route or one generated by another Black Hole node in 
the network. 
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4.1.2.2  AODV Black Hole 
An AODV Black Hole listens on its radio interface for arriving packets.  
When a packet arrives, it handles it in several ways, depending on the packet type.  
If the packet is a RREQ, the Black Hole immediately begins generating a false 
RREP.  One significant issue for the Black Hole is to guess the destination’s actual 
sequence number.  Methods for doing this are discussed in Section 3.2.3 and in 
[KHK09]; however, this implementation of an AODV Black Hole relies on the fact 
that the destination sequence numbers for all nodes in ns-2 running AODV begin at 
2.  If the simulation scenario is constructed to only have a single connection attempt 
for the entire experiment, then the Black Hole knows that the destination’s sequence 
number must be 2.  This behavior is equivalent to a Black Hole that is able to 
perfectly predict sequence numbers of any destination, making route selection in 
AODV purely about hop-count.  When it receives the RREQ, the AODV Black Hole 
places this initial destination sequence number into the RREP.  The Black Hole 
initializes the hop count to 2 in the RREP so that it will make the destination appear 
one hop from the Black Hole node to all nodes along the reverse path to the source 
node.  Before placing the RREP on the send queue, the source and destination of the 
RREP are set to the destination and source of the RREQ respectively. 
If the packet is not an AODV coordination packet, the Black Hole node 
silently drops the packet.  Like the DSR Black Hole, the AODV Black Hole is 
protocol compliant for all other packet types.  The Black Hole node accomplishes this 
by not corrupting its own routing table.  For example, when issuing the RREP, it 
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does not add this distance vector entry to its table.  When replying to a RREP 
spoofing the destination, it does not update its own destination sequence number. 
4.1.3  Simulation Validation 
To validate the setup of the system under test in ns-2, a portion of the 
experiment in [CPZ09] is conducted using the implemented Black Hole simulation 
models.  Cai’s experiment involved simulating a Black Hole attack for a DSR 
MANET of 50 nodes in a 1000m2 area.  The number of Black Holes in the network 
was a factor with selected levels as powers of 5.  One of the response variables Cai 
measured was packet loss percentage, which is simply the ratio of packets dropped 
due to Black Hole attack versus the number of packets sent by all source nodes. 
 
Figure 6: System Under Test Validation using Cai's Experiment 
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The validation is conducted via simulation for each Black Hole simulation 
model and for all Black Hole levels.  Each factor level combination is replicated 100 
times to derive the average packet loss percent for the given levels.   The results are 
shown in comparison to Cai’s original results in Figure 6.  The data shows both the 
AODV and DSR Black Hole models exhibit similar growth in packet loss as the 
number of Black Hole nodes is increased.  However, there is a noticeable difference 
between the performance of the AODV and DSR Black Hole attacks.  This will be 
problematic for the analytical Black Hole model because it does not account for these 
differences.   
4.2  Design of Experiment 
The experiment is a full factorial experiment that measures Packet Loss 
Percentage, a statistical measurement of  and Received Packet Percentage.  The 
selected factors are average node degree, MANET protocol, and number of Black 
Holes; the selected factor levels are shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Selected Factor Levels 
Average Node Degree {4,6,8,10} 
MANET Protocol {AODV, DSR} 
Number of Black Holes {0,1,2,5,10} 
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To compute , the attractor model requires the number of Black Holes in 
the network and the average node degree.  Since these are parameters of the 
analytical model, they are included as factors for the experiment to test different 
values of .  The levels for these factors are selected based on the tradeoff 
between validating every data point in Figure 5 and the computational limitations of 
the machine hosting the simulation.  The protocol is selected as a factor to determine 
if the model applies to more than one reactive MANET protocol and the levels cover 
both AODV and DSR, which are prototypical instantiations of the reactive MANET 
protocol class. 
4.2.1  Experiment and Simulation Parameters 
Table 4 lists the parameters used for the experiment and for each simulation 
within the experiment.  Because this is a full factorial experiment, the number of 
factor level combinations is 40, which is the product of the number of levels for each 
factor.  The number of replications is determined experimentally in Section 4.2.3.  
The number of simulations per replication is based on the need to simulate each 
possible source-destination pair in a given network topology.  Using the 
nomenclature from Section 3.5, the number of simulations per replication is 
| | ∗ | | 1       (25) 
where  is the set of non-malicious nodes in the network.  In this case, depending on 
the factor level for number of Black Holes, there are 40, 39, 38, 35, and 30 benign 
nodes respectively.  This results in 40 ∗ 39 , 39 ∗ 38 , 38 ∗ 37 , 35 ∗ 34 , and 
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30 ∗ 29  possible source-destination pairs for scenarios with 0, 1, 2, 5, and 10 Black 
Hole nodes respectively.  
Table 4: Selected Experiment and Simulation Parameters 
Factor Level Combinations 40 
Replications per Factor 
Level     Combination 
50 
Simulations per Replication 1560, 1482, 1406, 1190, 870 
Number of Nodes 40 
Simulation Duration 500 seconds 
Traffic Sources 1 per simulation 
Traffic Type Constant Bit Rate 
Traffic Rate 2.44 packets per second  
Packet Size 512 Bytes 
Data Rate 10 Kbps 
Traffic Start Time 0 
Traffic End Time 450 seconds 
Mobility None 
 
The values for simulation duration, node size, and traffic rate are selected 
based on values selected in prior published work in [CPZ09], [BhS09], and [DSE07].  
They are considered reasonable parameters for a modern ad-hoc network.  The CBR 
traffic source ceases sending packets at 450 seconds into a simulation to permit time 
for the packets in the system to be flushed out of the network.  This value is selected 
via observations of trace files from earlier pilot studies. 
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4.2.2  Response Variables 
Because the purpose of the experiment is to test the analytical model, the 
predictions of the model must be tied to measurable output variables in the 
simulation.  The two response variables Packet Loss Percentage and Received 
Packet Percentage measure the performance of an arbitrary route in a network.  
From (23),  can be isolated to be of the form 
      (26) 
Since every possible connection is simulated for a given topology, the 
population means of the number of dropped packets and number of sent packets can 
be computed. Let ,  and ,  be the population means of the topology generated in 
replication  for the average number of packets dropped and sent respectively.  Let 
Packet Loss Percentage be a statistical measurement of  and a response variable 
of the experiment.  From (26), the point estimator for  is 
,
,
      (26) 
Given  replications, Packet Loss Percentage is 
	 	
∑ ,
,      (27) 
A second response variable is Received Packet Percentage, which is the 
proportion of packets received by destination nodes in a route over the number of 
packets sent in the route.  Let ,  be the population mean of a given topology in 
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replication  for the average number of received packets in a route.  Given  
replications, Received Packet Percentage is measured as 
	 	
∑ ,
,     (28) 
This response variable is used to support Packet Loss Percentage by ensuring 
that the intended effect of a Black Hole attack (i.e., lost packets) is actually 
occurring.  If the Black Hole attack is truly dropping packets, then it is expected 
that the number of packets received is negatively correlated with the number of 
packets dropped by Black Hole attack.   
Upon completion of a simulation, ns-2 generates a packet trace file containing 
all events that occurred for each packet in the simulation.  Events such as a new 
packet being sent on the network, the destination receiving the packet, and a Black 
Hole dropping the packet are all captured in the trace file and can be counted for 
each simulation.   
During each replication,  , , , , and ,  are calculated after the simulation 
results for all possible source and destination pairs that have been collected.   
4.2.3  Method for Determining Number of Replications 
To account for random variation, the experiment is repeated several times 
using different random seeds to estimate the mean of each response variable.  
However, if the experiment is not repeated enough times, significant sampling bias 
will be inserted into the data, making it difficult to justify conclusions on the 
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collected data.  A common approach to determine a reasonable number of 
replications is to: 
1. Estimate a good number of replications. 
2. Run an experiment so that multiple groups of replications can be 
generated. 
3. Find the confidence intervals of response variables for each replication 
group. 
4. Compare all groups with each other to identify sampling bias. 
 
Sampling bias is minimized if the confidence intervals generally overlap and 
the interval distances are similar between independent experiments.  If they are not, 
then the number of replications is increased and the process is repeated until the 
desired stability is achieved. 
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Figure 7: Packet Loss Percentage for 10 groups with 50 replications 
 
Using the process described above, this experiment requires 50 replications 
to minimize sampling bias.  Figure 7 shows the 95% confidence intervals for the 
mean Packet Loss Percentage for each of the 10 groups of 50 replications.  Each 
replication of an experiment involved generating a random ad-hoc topology 
containing 40 nodes in a 750 m2 area with one Black Hole and independently 
simulating all possible connection pairs.  The figure shows that the confidence 
intervals overlap and are of similar length, implying that sampling bias is 
minimized. 
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4.2.4  Method for Determining Average Node Degree 
Methods such as the uniform density assumption in [Bet02] can be used to 
find the expected node degree of an ad-hoc topology; however, the model erroneously 
overestimates the node degree because it does not account for the border effects.  To 
avoid introducing this error into the experiment, average node degree is instead 
determined experimentally through simulation. 
Node degree is a function of the area and number of nodes deployed in the 
area.  Consequently, there are multiple solutions for a given node degree.  To find 
solutions, the number of nodes is fixed at 40 and multiple small experiments are 
conducted to find areas that result in the average degree matching each of the 
desired levels.  Each experiment consists of generating several random topologies 
using the setdest program given the number of nodes and operating area.  For each 
random topology, the output topology file from setdest is analyzed to derive a sample 
of the average node degree of the given parameters.  Several samples are collected to 
determine the average node degree of a random topology.  The error between the 
calculated and expected degree is used to refine the search for the correct area value.  
After several iterations of experimentation, the process converges on areas that 
result in the desired average node degree.  The process identifies that for a network 
of 40 nodes, areas of 1267m2, 1005m2, 850m2, and 750m2 provide an average node 
degree of 4, 6, 8, and 10 respectively. 
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Figure 8: Areas for 40 Node Network to Achieve Node Degree 
Figure 8 shows the 95% confidence intervals for the mean average node 
degree given the selected area size.  The intervals are taken from sampling 
randomly generated topologies containing 40 nodes and finding the average node 
degree.  The figure shows that even for a small sample size of 50, the confidence 
interval for the mean average node degree contains the desired average node degree 
without significant error. 
4.2.5  Experiment Process 
For each factor level combination, a series of replicated experiments are 
performed to minimize sample variation and result in an statistical measurement of 
: Packet Loss Percentage.  Each replication generates a new random ad-hoc 
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network topology based on the selected factor levels.  Thus, the difference between 
replications of the same factor level combination are the relative distances of the 
source, destination, and Black Hole nodes. 
For each replicated experiment, every possible source-destination pair in the 
network is simulated individually using the same topology and the number of 
packets sent by the source, received by the destination, and dropped by the a Black 
Hole node are recorded.  Rather than simulate a single scenario where all possible 
connection pairs attempt to connect to each other, each individual connection pair is 
evaluated independently in its own simulation instance.  This setup avoids 
confounding effects such as congestion between each connection pair or excessive 
congestion around the Black Hole nodes.   
Each unique single pair scenario involves the source sending constant bit 
rate traffic to the destination.  Depending on the relative locations of the source, 
destination, and the Black Hole nodes, packets may be dropped due to Black Hole 
attack.  After the scenario is simulated, the resulting trace file is examined to collect 
the number of sent, dropped, and received packets for that route.  After the results 
for all possible connection pairs are simulated, , , and  are calculated for the 
replication to generate a sample for Packet Loss Percentage and Received Packet 
Percentage.  The samples for Packet Loss Percentage and Received Packet 
Percentage are averaged to provide an estimation of Packet Loss Percentage and 
Received Packet for the given factor level combination. 
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V. Results and Analysis 
The experiment is executed and the metrics are collected using the setup and 
process described in Chapter IV.  The contents of this chapter are as follows:  Section 
5.1 presents the results, provides immediate observations about the data, and 
analyzes the error between the model and experiment to identify areas for further 
study.  Section 5.2 utilizes the experimental results to briefly evaluate an alternate 
form of the hypothesis.  Section 5.3 summarizes the inferences made from the data.  
Section 5.4 applies the inferences to evaluate the hypothesis. 
5.1  Experiment Results and Observations 
Figures 9 through 12 show the results obtained by the experiment.  The x-
axis in each figure is the number of Black Holes and the y-axis is a percent value 
that captures both metrics Packet Loss Percentage and Received Packet Percentage.  
In each figure the 95% confidence intervals of the estimation of the mean Packet 
Loss Percentage for both AODV and DSR protocols are plotted against the results 
derived from the analytical hypercube model.  Additionally, the sample mean of 
Received Packet Percentage is plotted on the same graph to show the effect of the 
Black Hole attack. 
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Figure 9:  4-Cube Model versus Ad-hoc Network with Average Degree 4 
 
Figure 9 depicts the results obtained for all MANET protocol levels, all Black 
Hole levels, and Average Node Degree 4 using an area of 1267m2.  The figure shows 
that Received Packet Percentage decreases as the number of Black Hole nodes 
increase for both protocols.  Even without Black Holes, only 60% of the traffic arrives 
at its destination.  Since the network has low density, it is possible that there are no 
routes between a source-destination pair due to network partitioning.  Experiments 
involving higher node degree (i.e., smaller area) result in higher density and lower 
probability of network partitioning.  The minimization of this probability allows 
Received Packet Percentage to approach 1.0 as the average node degree increases. 
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When the factor Average Node Degree is 4, the 4-cube model falls within or 
very close to the 95% confidence interval of the measured Packet Loss Percentage 
where the number of Black Holes is 1, 2, and 5.  However, the analytical model does 
not predict the correct performance results when there are 10 Black Holes.  
Figure 10 shows the performance results when the factor Average Node 
Degree is 6 for all protocol and Black Hole levels.  As expected, Received Packet 
Percentage decreases as the number of Black Holes increase.  The metric also shows 
that topologies of this class are less likely to be partitioned than 40-node topologies 
using an area of 1267m2.  While the 6-cube analytical model falls within the 
confidence intervals for AODV Packet Loss Percentage, the model does not correctly 
describe Black Hole performance for the DSR protocol. 
 
Figure 10:  6-Cube Model versus Ad-hoc Network with Average Degree 6 
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Figure 11 and Figure 12 exacerbate the issues exposed in Figure 10.  The 8-
cube and 10-cube analytical models do not accurately describe the behavior of Packet 
Loss Percentage for either protocol when the average node degree is 8 and 10 
respectively. 
 
Figure 11: 8-Cube Model versus Ad-hoc Network with Average Degree 8 
 
5.1.1  Observations on Results 
Overall, the model matches the order of growth for all experimental results.  
As the number of Black Hole nodes increase, the expected packet loss increases 
logarithmically.  While the 4-cube and 6-cube model fits well with the experimental 
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results, the 8-cube and 10-cube do not.  In fact, the difference between the model’s 
predication and the experiment results increases as the degree increases. 
 
Figure 12: 10-Cube Model versus Ad-hoc Network with Average Degree 10 
 
5.1.2  Inferences on the Experiment Results 
Because the model can predict the order of growth in performance as the 
number of Black Hole nodes increase, the model explains the effects of Black Hole 
attacks.  However, the accuracy of the model decreases as the average node degree 
increases.  Moreover, there is a discrepancy between the accuracy of predicting 
AODV and DSR Black Hole performance.  The results suggest that there is a hidden 
84 
 
behavioral difference in the route discovery process between the protocols or 
implementation of the Black Hole attack. 
5.1.3 Analysis of Model Error 
The significance of the modeling error over the entire experiment is examined 
to determine causality.  The squared difference between the measured Packet Loss 
Percentage and the analytical model’s prediction for AODV is shown in Figure 13.  
In this figure, the x-axis is the number of Black Holes, y-axis is the average node 
degree, and the z-axis is the squared difference between the experiment results and 
the analytical model. 
 
Figure 13: Residual Error of the Analytical Model and AODV 
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There are several observations to make about the surface of the error.  With 
respect to the average node degree, error is minimized when the degree is 6.  One 
explanation for the minimal error is because the number of nodes in the model is 
close to the number of nodes in the ad-hoc network.  In this case, a 6-cube with 64 
nodes is evaluated against the 40 node ad-hoc network.  It is reasonable to believe 
this also causes the increase in error as the number of Black Holes increase.  Recall 
that the analytical model uses random selection via hypergeometric distribution to 
determine the probability that at least one Black Hole node is in a favorable position 
to achieve an attack.  Consider the case where the degree is 10 and the number of 
Black Holes is also 10 for a 40 node network.  To achieve degree 10, the model 
assumes a 10-cube hypercube which has 1024 nodes.  It is easy to realize that 
drawing 10 samples from a population of 1024 nodes has a vastly different density 
function than taking the same number of samples from a population of 40 nodes.  
This suggests that it is more important for the topology approximation to match the 
number of nodes than the average node degree. 
Figure 14 shows the residual error between DSR experimental results and 
the analytical model.  While the error is more significant between the model and the 
DSR Black Hole implementation, the error still decreases as the number of nodes in 
the model approaches the number of nodes in the experiment.   
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Figure 14: Residual Error of the Analytical Model and DSR 
 
Two points of interest that deserve further explanation are the local 
anomalies in Figure 13 and Figure 14.  For Figure 13, there is a local maximum 
where the number of Black Holes is 2 and the average node degree is 6.  For Figure 
14, there is a local minimum where the average degree is 10 and there are 2 Black 
Hole nodes.  It is not clear if these points are due to Type-I error or hidden 
interactions not covered in the analytical model.  Further experimentation is 
required to explain these anomalies. 
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5.2  Consideration of Number of Nodes as Alternative Network Parameter 
The analysis of error in Section 5.1.3 suggests that it is more important to 
match the number of nodes than the node degree.  In this section, rather than have 
the analytical model match the average node degree, all experimental data is 
compared against the analytical model results using a 5-cube hop-distance density 
function.  The 5-cube provides the closest approximation to the actual number of 
nodes in the experiment.  Figures 15 through 18 show the expected percentage of 
packet loss versus the experimental networks with average node degrees of 4, 6, 8, 
and 10 respectively.   
 
Figure 15: Packet Loss for 5-Cube model versus Ad-hoc Network with 
Average Node Degree 4 
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The results of this comparison are promising.  The model’s prediction falls 
within the 95% confidence interval for the majority of AODV samples.  The 
exceptions are shown for the AODV Packet Loss Percentage for one Black Hole in 
Figure 16 and ten Black Holes in Figure 18.  The first deviation between the model 
and the AODV Black Hole implementation can be explained by Type-I error due to 
sampling; however, the second one cannot.  The significant deviation identifies the 
following possibilities: 1) there are interactions between Black Hole nodes that are 
not captured by the analytical model, 2) error increases as the average node degree 
deviates significantly from the degree of the analytical model, or 3) the border effects 
reduce the effectiveness of adding additional Black Holes. 
 
Figure 16: Packet Loss for 5-Cube model versus Ad-hoc Network with 
Average Node Degree 6 
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When observing the 5-cube model in comparison with the experimental 
results of the DSR Black Holes, the evidence that the analytical model predicts the 
effect is less compelling.  While the 5-cube model follows the same order of growth as 
the simulation results, in the majority of cases the 5-cube significantly over-
estimates the performance of DSR Black Holes.  Moreover, the experimental results 
show that as the average node degree increases by decreasing the area, DSR Black 
Hole attack performance decreases.  This may allude to the border effects discovered 
in [Bet02].  As the area decreases, the probability that an arbitrary node will 
encounter a border in the simulation increases.  Since the hypercube model does not 
address border effects, it can be expected that an unbounded model will 
overestimate the performance of Black Hole attacks.  What is not clear is why the 
border effect seems to affect DSR more than AODV. 
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Figure 17: Packet Loss for 5-Cube model versus Ad-hoc Network with 
Average Degree 8 
 
The main issue is that there is a significant difference in performance 
between the AODV and DSR Black Holes, making it difficult for an agnostic reactive 
protocol model to cover both protocols.  This is surprising considering they utilize the 
same route discovery process, which includes the RREQ flooding and route selection 
criteria.  Possible reasons for the difference include 1) there is an implementation 
difference in the NS-2 MANET protocol models, or 2) there is a difference between 
the implementations of the DSR and AODV Black Holes. 
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Figure 18: Packet Loss for 5-Cube model versus Ad-hoc Network with 
Average Node Degree 10 
 
For completeness, the residuals of the experiment and a 5-cube are shown 
against the residuals experienced when the analytical model matched the average 
node degree of the experiment in Figures 19 and 20. 
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Figure 19: Residual Differential of 5-Cube Model for AODV 
 
The figures provide evidence that using a hypercube topology to approximate 
the number of nodes in an ad-hoc network incurs less error than approximating the 
average node degree.  The residuals against the 5-cube are generally less than the 
matching average node degree strategy.  However, because the number of nodes is 
fixed to 40 for this experiment, a future experiment must be conducted to test this 
hypothesis against networks with different numbers of nodes to reach a valid 
conclusion on using this strategy.   
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Figure 20: Residual Differential of 5-Cube Model for DSR 
5.3  Summary of Findings 
 The analytical model explains the main effects of Black Hole attacks 
on Reactive MANET protocols. 
 The accuracy of the model is higher for AODV than DSR. 
 The accuracy of the model improves as the number of nodes in the 
topology approximation approaches the actual number of nodes in the 
ad-hoc topology; suggesting that it is more important for the topology 
approximation to match the number of nodes than the degree. 
 Inaccuracies of the analytical model may be explained by a 
mismatching of topology parameters between the hypercube 
approximation and the ad-hoc topology, border effects, hidden 
interactions between Black Hole nodes, and protocol or Black Hole 
implementation differences between DSR and AODV. 
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5.4  Conclusions on the Hypothesis 
While the evidence in support of the hypothesis is not convincing, there is 
suggestive evidence that the analytical model predicts the performance loss of an ad-
hoc network.  Additional experimentation is required to isolate the causes of the 
observed prediction error and to enhance the analytical model accordingly. 
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VI. Conclusion 
6.1  Summary of Work Performed 
In this thesis the Black Hole attack is explored as an optimization problem 
with constraints, which includes the extent to which a Black Hole node can fabricate 
a lucrative route for a source node route discovery advertisement.  Theorem 1 is 
developed for the shortest length falsified route.  This theorem is used to derive 
Theorem 2, which is the predicate-logic that determines whether a Black Hole 
attack is successful or not.   
While useful, the predicate requires a-priori knowledge about relative 
locations of the source, destination, and Black Hole nodes.  To be able to evaluate ad-
hoc topologies without knowing the relative distances for all of the nodes or the hop-
distance density function of the topology, it was hypothesized that a simpler topology 
with similar network parameters could be substituted in place of the ad-hoc 
topology.  Because of the symmetric qualities of the hypercube, the hop-distance 
density function is derived as a function of its degree.  The probability density 
function for a hypercube is substituted for a target ad-hoc network with similar 
network parameters to enable the evaluation of Theorem 2.  The application of the 
density function for hypercubes and Theorem 2 results in an analytical model that 
determines the probability an arbitrary route in a network is subject to Black Hole 
attack.   
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To evaluate the applicability of this analytical model, an experiment is 
conducted via simulation.  The percentage of packet loss is measured for multiple 
ad-hoc network configurations including different MANET protocols, average node 
degree, and number of Black Hole nodes in the network.  The results of the 
experiment show that the analytical model describes the probability of Black Hole 
attack; however, the model suffers from second-order interactions that are not 
considered in the model (e.g., protocol differences, interactions between Black Holes, 
etc.). 
6.2  Accomplishments 
There are several significant accomplishments of this thesis.  First, two 
theorems are given to formalize limitations on Black Hole attacks for reactive 
MANET protocols that use hop-count to select routes.  This work developed a 
predicate to explain the reason a Black Hole attack is successful or not for this class 
of network protocols.  Second, simplifying network topologies via topology 
substitution is a completely new approach to solving network problems.  Third, the 
hop-distance density function for hypercube topologies was developed using a 
recurrence relationship.  Fourth, an alternative Black Hole analytical model to 
König’s Black Hole model in Section 2.3.3.2 has been developed and tested under a 
variety of ad-hoc network configurations.  This model has been shown to explain the 
general effect of Black Hole attacks and supports the proposed theorems for reactive 
MANET protocols in ad-hoc networks. 
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6.3  Recommendations for Future Work 
While significant work has been accomplished for this thesis, it has also 
exposed areas ripe for additional exploration.  This section provides direction for the 
near and far term plans within this thesis topic. 
6.3.1  Near-term Plans 
Work that should immediately follow this thesis includes 1) experiments to 
understand and characterize the model error, 2) determining which network 
parameters make the biggest impact in topology approximation, and 3) discovering 
the reason the AODV and DSR Black Hole performances are different. 
6.3.2  Long-term Plans 
Other work includes exploration of areas that were not covered by this thesis.  
First, the choice of using the hypercube interconnection network was purely from 
intuition.  A useful experiment would be one that tests the hypothesis that this is 
the best topology for ad-hoc topology substitution instead of other interconnection 
networks (e.g., k-ary n-cubes, n-ary trees).   
Second, while Section 3.2 explores the different constraints of Black Hole 
attacks, the analytical model only considers the limitations on falsification of 
coordination messages.  One interesting and unexplored area is to model the effects 
of the self-imposed denial of service presented in Section 3.2.3.  This model could 
determine the steady state number of routes that pass through a Black Hole.  
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Combining this model with the analytical model presented in this thesis will provide 
a more accurate prediction of effects.   
Third, the thesis experiment tested the analytical model against a very 
simple network.  Because the model does not consider the effects of congestion, route 
caching, flow routing, snooping, and mobility, they were omitted from the 
experiment.  Moreover, hop-count is only considered in AODV if the sequence 
numbers match, so it would be beneficial to incorporate behaviors of sequence 
number guessing into an exclusive AODV version of the analytical model.  Future 
work could focus on incorporating these elements into the model, or at least 
quantifying the accuracy of the existing model against networks with more complex 
functionality. 
Fourth, there are some areas for improvement within the mathematics of the 
model with the goal of simplifying the calculation of expected network performance 
loss.  For example, the recurrence relationship in the density function for the 
neighbor distance in a hypercube could be transformed into a closed-form 
differential equation using methods described in the Recurrences Chapter in 
[CLR04].  In addition, the analytical model produces a response that is logarithmic.  
It seems reasonable to expect that the effects of a Black Hole attack can be 
generalized using fitting methods as a logarithmic function. 
  
99 
 
Bibliography 
[AHK04] I. Aad, J.-P. Hubaux, and E.W. Knightly. "Denial of service resilience 
in ad hoc networks." Proceedings of Mobicom. 2004. pp. 202-215. 
[AHK08] I. Aad, J.-P. Hubaux, and E. W. Knightly. "Impact of Denial of Service 
Attacks on Ad Hoc Networks." IEEE/ACM Transactions on 
Networking, Vol 16, No 4, 2008: pp. 791-802. 
[Bet02] C. Bettstetter."On the Minimum Node Degree and Connectivity of a 
Wireless Multihop Network." Proceedings of the 3rd AMC 
international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing. 
Lausanne, Switzerland: ACM, 2002. pp. 80-91. 
[BeE03] C. Bettstetter, J. Eberspacher. "Hop Distances in Homogeneous Ad 
Hoc Networks." Vehicular Technology Conference. IEEE, 2003. pp. 
2286-2290. 
[BhS09] N. Bhalaji, and A. Shanmugam. "Association Between Nodes to 
Combat Blackhole Attack in DSR Based MANET." International 
Conference on Wireless and Optical Communications Networks. 2009. 
pp. 1-5. 
[BJJ07] W. Bing, C. Jianmin, W. Jie, and M. Cardei. "A Survey on Attacks and 
Countermeasures in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks." In Wireless Network 
Security, by Y. Xiao, X. Shen and D.-Z. Du, 103-136. New York, NY: 
Springer, 2007. 
[CFG11] B. G. Constantine, G. Forget, R. Geib, and R. Schrage. Framework for 
TCP Throughput Testing. Internet Engineering Task Force Network 
Working Group, 2011.  http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc6349.html.  Last 
accessed: Feb 7, 2012. 
[ChP10] I. Chakeres, and C. Perkins. Dynamic MANET On-demand Routing 
version 21. Internet-Draft, Internet Engineering Task Force, 2010.  
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-manet-dymo-21.  Last accessed: Feb, 
7 2012. 
[Cla88] D. Clark. "The design philosophy of the DARPA internet protocols." 
Symposium proceedings on Communications architectures and 
protocols. ACM, 1988. pp. 106-114. 
100 
 
[CLR04] T. Cormen, C. Leiserson, R. Rivest, and C. Stein. “Introduction to 
Algorithms” 5th Ed. Cambridge, Massachusetts: McGraw-Hill, 2004. 
[CPZ09] J. Cai, , P. Yi, Y. Zhou, and N. Liu. "The Simulation and Comparison 
of Routing Attacks on DSR Protocol." International Conference on 
Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing. 2009. 
pp. 1-4. 
[DhS08] A. Dhane, and S. Sharma. "Modeling and Analysis of Sequence 
Number Attack and its Detection in AODV." 16th IEEE International 
Conference on Networks. IEEE, 2008. pp. 1-6. 
[DSE07] S. Dokurer, Y. M. Erten, and C. E. Acar. "Performance analysis of ad-
hoc networks under black hole attacks." SoutheastCon. IEEE, 2007. 
148-153. 
[Fol11] Lt. Col. R. L. Folks. “Network Centric Operations in the Age of 
Cyberspace Operations.” Thesis, Carlisle Barracks: United States 
Army War College, 2011. 
[FZJ09] Q. Feng, Z. Cai, J. Yang, and X. Hu. "A Performance Comparison of 
the Ad Hoc Network Protocols." Second International Workshop on 
Computer Science and Engineering. 2009. pp. 293-297. 
[GAM07] E. Gerhards-Padilla, N. Aschenbruch, and P. Martini. "Detecting 
Black Hole Attacks in Tactical MANETs using Topology Graphs." 
32nd IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks. 2007. pp. 1043-
1049. 
[GoY02] S. Gou, and O.W. Yang. "Performance of backup source routing in 
mobile ad hoc networks." Wireless Communications and Networking 
Conference, 2002. WCNC2002. 2002 IEEE. 2002. pp. 440-444. 
[Hwa93] K. Hwang. "Advanced Computer Architecture: Parallelism, 
Scalability, Programmability." In 2.4 System Interconnect 
Architectures, 75-96. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993. 
[JHM07] D. Johnson, Y. Hu, and D. Maltz. The Dynamic Source Routing 
Protocol (DSR) for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks. IETF, 2007.  
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4728.txt.  Last accessed: Feb 7, 2011 
[JP 3-13] JP 3-13 Information Operations. Joint Publication, Defense Technical 
Information Center, 2006. 
101 
 
[KAD07] N. Kettaf, H. Abouaissa, T. Vu Duong, and P. Lorenz. Admission 
Control enabled On demand Routing (ACOR) version 3. Internet 
Standard Draft (Expired), Internet Engineering Task Force, 2007.  
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kettaf-manet-acor-03.  Last accessed: 
Feb 7, 2011.  
[KGA06] S. Khurana, N. Gumpta, and N. Aneja. "Reliable Ad-hoc On-demand 
Distance Vector Routing Protocol." Networking, International 
Conference on Systems and International Conference on Mobile 
Communications and Learning Technologies, 2006. ICN/ICONS/MCL 
2006. International Conference on. 2006. pp. 98. 
[KHK09] A. König, M. Hollick, T. Krop, and R. Steinmetz. "GeoSec: quarantine 
zones for mobile ad hoc networks." Security and Communications 
Networks. Wiley InterScience, 2009. pp. 271-288. 
[KiL07] D. Kiwior, and L. Lam. "Routing Protocol Performance Over 
Intermittent Links." MITRE, 2007.  
http://www.mitre.org/work/tech_papers/tech_papers_07/07_0778/07_07
78.pdf.  Last accessed: Feb 7, 2012. 
[KSS09] A. König, D. Seither, R. Steinmetz, and M. Hollick. "An Analytical 
Model of Routing, Misbehavior, and Countermeasures in Mobile Ad 
Hoc Networks." Global Telecommunications Conference. IEEE, 2009. 
pp. 1-6. 
[Lun00] J. Lundberg. "Routing Security in Ad Hoc Networks." Seminar on 
Network Security. 2000. pp. 1-12. 
[MiA03] S. J. Milton, and J. C. Arnold. "Introduction to Probability and 
Statistics: Principles and Applications for Engineering and the 
Computing Sciences." New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003. 
[Net11] The Network Simulator. September 13, 2011. 
http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns/. Last accessed September 13, 2011. 
[OYM02] R. Onishi, S. Yamaguchi, H. Morino, H. Aida, and T. Saito. "The 
Multi-agent System for Dynamic Network Routing." Proceedings on 
the 5th International Symposium on Autonomous Decentralized 
Systems. 2002. pp. 375-382. 
[PBD03] C. Perkins, E. Belding-Royer, and S. Das. Ad hoc On-Demand 
Distance Vector (AODV) Routing RFC-3561. IETF, 2003.  
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3561.txt.  Last accessed Feb 7, 2012. 
102 
 
[PSA09] A. Prathapani, L. Santhanam, and P. Agrawal. "Intelligent Honeypot 
Agent for Blackhole Attack Detection in Wireless Mesh Networks." 
6th International Conference on Mobile Adhoc and Sensor Systems. 
2009. pp. 753-758. 
[Ric00] Rice Monarch Project. Implementation of DSR. April 25, 2000. 
http://www.monarch.cs.rice.edu/dsr-impl.html.  Last accessed Sep 13, 
2011. 
[SaS88] Y. Saad, and M. H. Schultz. "Topological Properties of Hypercubes." 
IEEE Transactions on Computers, 1988: pp. 867-872. 
[Son09] A. Song. picoNet. July 17, 2009. http://sourceforge.net/projects/piconet/ 
(accessed September 13, 2011). 
[Ste94] W. Stevens. "TCP/IP Illustrated Volume 1." In The Protocols, by W. 
Stevens, 297-306. Addison-Wesley, 1994. 
[TAC09] M. Tiwari, K.V. Arya, R. Choudhari, and K. S. Choudhary. "Designing 
Intrusion Detection to Detect Black hole and Selective Forwarding 
Attack in WSN based on local Information." Fourth International 
Conference on Computer Sciences and Convergence Information 
Technology. 2009. pp. 824-828. 
[YaM03] P. Yau, and C. Mitchell. "Security Vulnerabilities in Ad Hoc 
Networks." Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on 
Communication Theory and Applications. Ambleside, UK, 2003. pp. 
99-104. 
[ZPY10] S. Zhan, Y. Peng, Y. Yang, and J. Li. "An Open Architecture for the 
Routing Protocols Design in Ad Hoc Networks." IEEE International 
Conference on Computer Science and Information Technology. 2010. 
pp. 18-22. 
 
 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
Form Approved 
OMBNo. 074-0188 
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and 
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of the collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA  22202-4302.  Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to an penalty for failing to comply with a collection of 
information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.   
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 
22-03-2012 
2. REPORT TYPE  
Master’s Thesis 
3. DATES COVERED (From – To) 
June 2008 – March 2012 
TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
 
A BLACK HOLE ATTACK MODEL FOR REACTIVE AD-HOC 
PROTOCOLS 
 
5a.  CONTRACT NUMBER 
5b.  GRANT NUMBER 
 
5c.  PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 
6.  AUTHOR(S) 
 
Mr. Badenhop, Christopher W. 
 
5d.  PROJECT NUMBER 
12G289 
5e.  TASK NUMBER 
5f.  WORK UNIT NUMBER 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(S) 
 Air Force Institute of Technology 
 Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/ENY) 
 2950 Hobson Way, Building 640 
 WPAFB OH 45433-8865 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
    REPORT NUMBER 
 
AFIT/GCO/ENG/12-01 
9.  SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
 Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL/RYWC) 
   BLD 620  
   2241 Avionics Circle 
   WPAFB, OH 45433 
   937-528-8140 
  Juan.carbonell@wpafb.af.mil 
   POC: Juan Carbonell, Branch Chief 
 
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 
AFRL/RYWC (AFMC) 
 
11.  SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED. 
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  
This material is declared a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. 
14. ABSTRACT  
 
Net-Centric Warfare places the network in the center of all operations, making it a critical resource to attack and defend 
during wartime.  This thesis examines one particular network attack, the Black Hole attack, to determine if an analytical model can be 
used to predict the impact of this attack on ad-hoc networks.  An analytical Black Hole attack model is developed for reactive ad-hoc 
network protocols DSR and AODV.  To simplify topology analysis, a hypercube topology is used to approximate ad-hoc topologies 
that have the same average node degree.  An experiment is conducted to compare the predicted results of the analytical model against 
simulated Black Hole attacks on a variety of ad-hoc networks.  The results show that the model describes the general order of growth 
in Black Hole attacks as a function of the number of Black Holes in a given network.  The model accuracy maximizes when both the 
hypercube approximation matches the average degree and number of nodes of the ad-hoc topology.  For this case, the model falls 
within the 95% confidence intervals of the estimated network performance loss for 17 out of 20 measured scenarios for AODV and 7 
out of 20 for DSR. 
15. SUBJECT TERMS 
   Network availability, Black Hole attack, hop-distance density function, ad-hoc networks 
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
OF: 
17. LIMITATION 
OF  
     ABSTRACT 
 
UU 
18. 
NUMBER  
OF PAGES 
 
113 
19a.  NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON 
Barry Mullins,  ADVISOR 
a. 
REPORT 
 
U 
b. 
ABSTRACT 
 
U 
c. THIS 
PAGE 
 
U 
19b.  TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) 
785-3636 x7979 (barry.mullins@afit.edu) 
   Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18
 
